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I. INTRODUCTION 
The employment provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act 
("ADA"), which prohibit discrimination against disabled employees and 
applicants, became effective on July 26, 1992. 1 As is the case with most 
employee protective legislation, unions were among the supporters of 
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1. President Bush signed the ADA (Pub. L. 101-336, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 327-378) on 
July 26, 1990. The employment provisions covering employers with twenty-five or more 
employees took effect on July 26, 1992. Effective July 26, 1994, the Act will cover employers 
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the ADA, but Congress appears to have given little thought to the impli-
cations of the ADA for the unionized workplace.2 Unlike the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), 3 after which it was patterned, 
the ADA covers labor organizations. But in contrast to Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act,4 which also covers labor organizations, the ADA does 
not contain language expressly defining the nondiscrimination obliga-
tions of unions.5 Thus, there is no statutory blueprint fqr applying the 
ADA in the unionized workplace. 
This Article explores the issues raised by application of the ADA in 
the organized6 employment setting. The Article begins with an over-
view of the statute and then analyzes its applicability in the unionized 
workplace. In addition to recommending changes in the statute and reg-
ulations to clarify the obligations of employers and unions under the 
ADA, the Article makes recommendations with respect to judicial inter-
pretation of the statute in three major areas. In Sections III C through E, 
the Article analyzes the circumstances under which the union should be 
held liable for discrimination, recommending that courts assess liability 
based on the union's actions with respect to disability discrimination and 
not solely on the basis of status as a party to the collective bargaining 
agreement. 
Section III F analyzes the statutory accommodation obligation and 
points out several potential conflicts between statutory obligations 
imposed by the ADA and those imposed by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act ("NLRA"), which governs union-management relations.7 
2. See S. REP. No. 116, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989). As one commentator noted, the 
issues created by application of the ADA in the unionized workplace result from the intersection 
of the individual rights model of workplace regulation and the "industrial pluralist model of 
collective bargaining". See Richard A. Bales, Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act: 
Conflicts Between Reasonable Accommodation and Collective Bargaining, 2 CORNELL J.L. & 
Pus. PoL'v 161, 164 (1992). Another commentator describes the problem as one created by the 
dichotomy between public and private rights and proposes modifications of the arbitration system 
to allow employees to vindicate public rights effectively in the arbitral forum. See Robert J. 
Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 169, 242-63 (1991). 
While Rabin does not focus specifically on the ADA, he does analyze the problems created when 
a disabled worker's statutory rights conflict with the rights of other workers under the collective 
bargaining agreement. Id. at 244-49. 
3. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities by federal agencies, federal contractors and federal fund recipients. See 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 791, 793-795 ( 1988). 
4. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e (1988). 
5. Title VII contains express provisions defining unlawful discrimination by unions. See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1988). The ADA defines "covered entity" to include labor organizations and 
prohibits discrimination by covered entities. ADA§§ 101(2), 102, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12112 
(Supp. II 1990). 
6. The Article uses the terms "unionized" and "organized" interchangeably. 
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-303 (1988). The NLRA covers private employers in interstate 
commerce. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988). 
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These potential conflicts include conflicts between the ADA's require-
ments and collective bargaining agreements negotiated pursuant to the 
NLRA.8 The Article makes several recommendations to resolve the 
conflicts and effectuate accommodation of employees with disabilities. 
First, the confidentiality requirements of the statute should be inter-
preted to allow disclosure to the union and affected employees of infor-
mation about the employee's disability that is necessary to accomplish 
an effective accommodation. Second, the employer should be required 
to discuss with the union any accommodations that affect terms and con-
ditions of employment. In addition, where an accommodation would 
adversely affect the collectively bargained rights· of other employees, the 
courts should find that undue hardship relieves the union and the 
employer of the duty to accommodate. Nevertheless, the ADA permits 
agreements to accommodate in violation of the collective bargaining 
agreement, and the Article recommends that challenges to such agree-
ments by other employees be rejected in the absence of evidence of dis-
criminatory motive. 
Finally, Section III G reviews the impact of grievance arbitration 
under the collective bargaining agreement on claims under the ADA. 
While commending grievance arbitration as ah effective method for 
resolving disability discrimination issues in many cases, the Article rec-
ommends that judicial action· under the ADA remain available to the 
employee regardless of the outcome of any grievance arbitration. 
These recommendations will best accommodate the purposes of 
both the NLRA and the ADA by minimizing litigation where possible, 
while protecting the rights of all employees. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ADA 
Congress passed the Americans With Disabilities Act in 1990 to 
address the problem of discrimination against the estimated 43 million 
Americans with disabilities, which Congress concluded costs billions of 
dollars because of unnecessary dependency and nonproductivity.9 The 
statute contains provisions directed at employment, transportation, pub-
lic accommodation, and telecommunications. 10 The employment provi-
sions, contained in Title I, prohibit discrimination against "a qualified 
8. When a labor organization has been chosen by a majority to represent the employees of a 
particular employer, the employer and the union are obliged to negotiate with one another in good 
faith. Any agreement reached is reflected in a collective bargaining agreement which is binding 
on both parties. See ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW 386-87 (11th ed. 1991). 
9. See ADA§ 2, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. II 1990). 
10. See ADA §§ 101-107; §§ 221-230, 241-245; §§ 301-309; §§ 401-02, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12111-12117; §§ 12141-12150, §§ 12161-12165; §§ 12181-12189; 47 u.s.c. §§ 225, 152(b), 
221, 611 (Supp. II 1990). 
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individual with a disability because of the disability ... in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge of employ-
ees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, 
and privileges of employment."11 The three key concepts in the employ-
ment provisions are what constitutes a disability, who is a qualified indi-
vidual with a disability, and what is discrimination. 
Disability is defined as "a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individ-
ual."12 This definition is based on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
and has been significantly litigated under that statute. 13 Major life activ-
ities are those activities that the average person can perform with little or 
no difficulty, including walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, learning, 
working, caring for oneself, and participating in community activities. 14 
A qualified individual with a disability is one who, "with or with-
out reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions" of 
the job. 15 The essential functions of the job are determined by the 
employer. Written job descriptions will be considered as evidence of the 
essential functions. 16 
The ADA details a number of actions constituting discrimination, 
11. ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 1990). 
12. ADA § 3(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a) (Supp. II 1990). The definition of disability 
also includes "a record of such impairment", ADA § 3(2)(8), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(8) (Supp. II 
1990), and "being regarded as having such an impairment". ADA § 3(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. 
§ l2102(2)(C) (Supp. II 1990). Thus, if a person has a history of disability but no longer is 
disabled, he or she is protected from discrimination on the basis of that record. For example, an 
employer cannot refuse to hire a cancer survivor whose cancer has been successfully treated. 
Similarly, if an employer discriminates against an individual based on the belief that the individual 
is disabled, the individual is protected even though not disabled. For example, an employer 
cannot refuse to hire an individual whose back x-rays show arthritis, but who has no symptoms or 
limitations as a result of the arthritis and therefore does not meet the statutory definition of 
disability. 
The statute expressly eliminates certain conditions from the definition of disability, including 
homosexuality, bisexuality, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, current illegal drug 
use, "transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity 
disorders not resulting from physical impairments or other sexual behavior disorders." ADA 
§ 511, 42 U.S.C. § 12211(Supp.II1990). 
13. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 21. 
14. See 29 C.F.R. § l630.2(i) (1992). Inability to perform a particular job or a small number 
of jobs is not sufficient to constitute a substantial limit on the major life activity of working. 
15. ADA§ 101(8), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. II 1990). 
16. See id. Of course, if the employer's determination of essential functions is challenged in a 
discrimination action, the court may decide that the designated functions are not essential. Other 
evidence to be considered in determining essential functions includes the amount of time spent 
performing the function, the work experience of incumbents in the job with respect to the 
function, the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and the consequences of not requiring 
the incumbents to perform the functions. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1992). 
1994] ADA AND UNIONS 571 
which include intentional discrimination;17 use of standards, criteria, 
methods of administration, tests or selection criteria that have the effect 
of discrimination; 18 and failure to reasonably accommodate a qualified 
individual with a disability. 19 The statute also prohibits participation in 
a contractual arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting 
a qualified disabled employee or applicant to discrimination. 20 Retalia-
tion against an individual for opposing unlawful actions or for participat-
ing in any proceeding under the ADA is expressly banned.21 
The three primary defenses to a claim of discrimination are busi-
ness necessity, direct threat, and undue hardship. An employer22 may 
justify the use of discriminatory job qualifications, selection criteria, or 
tests by establishing that they are job related and consistent with busi-
ness necessity.23 The statute also permits an employer to use a qualifica-
tion standard requiring that an individual not pose a direct threat to the 
health or safety of others in the workplace.24 Finally, an employer may 
refuse to reasonably accommodate a disabled individual if the accom-
modation would impose undue hardship on the employer's business. 25 
Additionally, of course, an employer could defend a claim under the 
ADA by proving that an individual was not disabled or not qualified for 
the position, or that the individual was not discriminated against because 
of the disability. 
In addition to other prohibitions on discrimination, the ADA 
directly limits the use of medical examinations. A medical examination 
may be required of an applicant only after an offer of employment is 
made. 26 The offer may be conditioned on the results of the examination 
only if all new employees are subjected to the examination, the medical 
information is kept confidential, and any disqualification resulting from 
17. See H.R. REP. No. 485, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310. 
18. See ADA§ 102(b)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (Supp. II 1990); ADA§ 102(b)(6), 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. II 1990). These sections of the ADA codify the disparate impact 
theory of discrimination. 
19. ADA§ 102(b)(S), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (Supp. II 1990). 
20. See ADA§ 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990). This provision expressly 
incorporates a contract with a labor organization as one that cannot subject an individual to 
discrimination. 
21. See ADA § 503(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (Supp. II 1990). The statute further bars 
coercion, intimidation, threats or interference with individuals exercising rights under the Act or 
encouraging others to do so. ADA§ 503(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (Supp. II 1990). 
22. The term employer is used in this discussion for simplicity, but the provisions apply to 
covered entities which include, inter alia, labor organizations. 
23. See ADA§ 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (Supp. II 1990). This defense is applicable to 
disparate impact cases. 
24. See ADA§ 103(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (Supp. II 1990). 
25. See ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990). 
26. See ADA § 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c) (Supp. II 1990). 
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the examination is based on criteria that are job-related and consistent 
with business necessity. 27 An employer may inquire about an appli-
cant's ability to perform the job, but not about the applicant's disabil-
ity. 28 Required medical examinations for employees also must be job-
related and consistent with business necessity.29 
The ADA's substantive provisions are patterned after the Rehabili-
tation Act and the regulations issued pursuant thereto. The legislative 
history directs courts and covered entities to the Rehabilitation Act for 
guidance in interpreting the ADA.30 The enforcement and remedial pro-
visions of the ADA track those of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.31 
III. THE ADA AND UNIONS 
As noted previously, labor organizations are covered entities under 
the ADA.32 Yet unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, there are no 
provisions in the ADA specifically proscribing or defining discrimina-
tion by labor unions.33 Thus, the same nondiscrimination provisions 
apply to the employer and the union. There are several specific refer-
ences to unions and collective bargaining agreements in the statute and 
the regulations. Section 102(b )(2) of the statute bars covered entities 
from participating in a contractual arrangement or relationship with a 
labor union that has the effect of subjecting an individual to 
discrimination. 34 
The regulations and interpretive guidance issued by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") address collective 
bargaining agreements in two respects. First, the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement are one factor in the determination of whether a 
particular function is an essential function of the job that a person with a 
disability holds or desires.35 Second, the terms of a collective bargain-
27. See ADA§ 102(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(3) (Supp. II 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) 
(1992). 
28. See ADA § 102(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2) (Supp. II 1990). 
29. See ADA § 102(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(4) (Supp. II 1990). 
30. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 25-27, 30, 31, 34; H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), 
supra note 17, at 23, 50, 52, 54-55, 61-62, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 304, 332, 334, 336-37, 
343-44. 
31. See ADA§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. II 1990); H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra 
note 17, at 23, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304. 
32. See ADA§ 101(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (Supp. II 1990). The term labor organization 
has the same definition under the ADA as under Title VII. See ADA § 101(7), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111 (7) (Supp. II 1990). Under Title VII, the term is defined broadly enough to cover virtually 
all labor organizations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e) (1988). 
33. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(c) (1988). 
34. See ADA § 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990). 
35. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(v) (1992). The EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual 
notes, however, that mere listing in a collective bargaining agreement does not mc;:an that a 
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ing agreement "may be relevant" to a determination of whether an 
accommodation would be unduly disruptive to the employees or the 
functioning of the business. 36 
Also relevant to determining the applicability of the ADA in the 
unionized workplace is Congress's suggestion, repeated in the EEOC's 
Technical Assistance Manual,. that employers and unions can avoid con-
flicts between the ADA's requirements and the collective bargaining 
agreement by negotiating a contract provision permitting the employer 
to take all actions necessary to comply with the ADA.37 
These references from the statute, legislative history and regula-
tions offer limited guidance regarding the applicability of the ADA in 
the unionized workplace. Not only are there questions about the obliga-
tions of unions under the ADA, but there are also issues about compli-
ance with potentially conflicting obligations under the ADA and the 
NLRA. The following sections will analyze the application of the ADA 
in the organized setting, utilizing not only the language and legislative 
history of the statute, but also the regulations and the case law under the 
Rehabilitation Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. · 
A. The Union as a Covered Entity 
The inclusion of labor organizations in the definition of "covered 
entities" under the statute suggests that unions are subject to the same 
prohibitions on discrimination as employers.38 Unquestionably, when 
the union acts as an employer vis a vis its own employees, it will be 
treated like any other employer under the statute. 39 When the union acts 
function is essential. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Technical Assistance 
Manual on Title I of ADA§ 7.ll(a), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:6981, 7050 (1992). 
36. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d), app. (1992). The EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual 
notes that where a collective bargaining agreement reserves particular jobs for individuals with a 
certain amount of seniority, that "may be" a factor in determining whether it would be an undue 
hardship to assign a disabled individual without such seniority to the job. See Technical 
Assistance Manual, supra note 35, at § 7.ll(a), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:7050. The 
regulations conform to suggestions in the legislative history. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 
32; H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 63. 
37. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 32; H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), supra note 17, at 63, 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 346; Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 35, §§ 3.9, 
7.ll(a), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:7007, 405:7050. 
38. See Joanne Jocha Ervin, Reasonable Accommodation and the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 3 DET. C.L. REv. 925, 960 (1991). 
39. See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LAW 618 (2d ed. 1983) ("A union acts in the role of an employer with respect to persons it itself 
employs, and, like any other employer is subject to liability under the employment discrimination 
laws for discrimination against its employees or applicants for employment."). When a union is 
sued as an employer, the union must meet the definition of employer under the statute, however. 
See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 270 
(2d ed. Five Year Cum. Supp. 1989) .. 
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as a union, however, its obligations are less clear. The only mention of 
unions in the section defining discrimination is the prohibition on partic-
ipation in a contract with a union that subjects an employee or applicant 
to discrimination.40 Since a union does not contract with itself, the lan-
guage suggests that only employers are covered by the prohibition. 
Even if that provision applies only to employers, however, one could 
argue that all other prohibitions on discrimination apply to employers 
and unions alike. 
Since the Rehabilitation Act does not cover unions, it provides little 
direction for interpreting the ADA in this regard. Title VII provides 
more assistance, but unlike the ADA contains prohibitions tailored to the 
union's role in the workplace.41 By way of contrast, the ADA prohibits 
discrimination in regard to application procedures, hiring, promotion, 
discharge, compensation, training, and "other terms, conditions and priv-
ileges of employment."42 These functions are generally performed by 
the employer rather than the union, although the employer's actions may 
be circumscribed by the collective bargaining agreement.43 This lan-
guage in the ADA provides further support for limiting many of the 
discrimination provisions to employers. The EEOC, however, has taken 
the position that the ADA imposes the same obligations on unions that it 
imposes on employers.44 
In light of the clear definition of covered entity, and the express 
application of the discrimination prohibitions to covered entities, the 
40. See ADA § 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990). 
41. Title VII provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate 
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or to classify its membership or applicants for 
membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, 
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an 
individual in violation of this section. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1988). 
42. ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 1990). 
43. The Supreme Court described the role of management in United Steelworkers of America 
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). "Collective bargaining agreements 
regulate or restrict the exercise of management functions; they do not oust management from the 
performance of them. Management hires and fires, pays and promotes, supervises and plans. All 
these are part of its function .... " Id. at 583. See also David Offen Simon, Note, Union Liability 
Under Title VII for Employer Discrimination, 68 GEo. L.J. 959, 961 (1980). 
44. In its Technical Assistance Manual, the EEOC states that labor unions are covered by the 
ADA and have the same obligations as employers to comply with its requirements. Technical 
Assistance Manual, supra note 35, §§ 3.9, 7.1 l(a), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:7007, 405:7050. 
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more persuasive argument is that the ADA's discrimination prohibitions 
apply equally to unions. This interpretation is consistent with the 
ADA's goal of eliminating discrimination against the disabled. This 
conclusion does not answer the question of what role the union must 
play in the discrimination in order to be held liable. Does the existence 
of a contract provision that results in discrimination impose liability on 
the union? Or must the union take an active role in the conduct alleged 
to be discriminatory? Furthermore, does the discrimination ban apply to 
the union in its contract administration role? And finally, does the union 
have an affirmative duty to contest discrimination by the employer? 
B. The Collective Bargaining Process 
In order to analyze these questions, it is necessary to have an under-
standing of the collective bargaining process. Once employees have 
chosen a union to represent them, the NLRA imposes upon their 
employer a duty to bargain in good faith with the union.45 This duty 
requires the parties to meet and negotiate wages, hours, and terms and 
conditions of employment, but does not require the parties to reach 
agreement.46 Each party has available certain economic weapons to 
attempt to convince the other party to accept the contract provisions that 
it desires.47 The primary union weapon is the strike.48 The employer, 
however, may lock out the employees,49 permanently replace the 
employees if they strike, 50 and implement the terms and conditions of 
employment that it desires if the parties reach an impasse in negotia-
tions. 51 The agreement reached, if any, is generally a function of the 
relative economic power of the parties and the strength of their desire for 
particular contract provisions.52 The union's "desire" is not merely the 
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (1988). 
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102 (1970). 
47. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'! Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960). 
48. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1088 (Patrick Hardin et al., eds., 3d ed. 1992) 
[hereinafter "Hardin"]. 
49. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965); Harter Equip. Inc., 280 
N.L.R.B. 597 (1986), review denied sub nom. Local 825, IUOE v. NLRB, 829 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 
1987). 
50. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). Employees engaged 
in an unfair labor practice strike must be reinstated, even if the employer must discharge 
permanent replacements to do so. See NLRB v. Efco Mfg., Inc., 227 F.2d 675, 676 (!st Cir. 
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956). Currently, legislation is pending that would bar 
employers from permanently replacing strikers. The Workplace Fairness Act, Bill No. S. 55 was 
reintroduced in the 103d Congress, 1st Session. 139 CONG. REc. Sl91 (daily ed. January 21, 
1993). The bill has been named the Cesar Chavez Workplace Fairness Act, and passed the House 
on June 15, 1993. H.R. 5, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CoNG. REC. H3527 (daily ed. June 15, 
1993). 
51. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741-42 (1962). 
52. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE 
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desire of the union as an entity, or its employees, but the desire of the 
employees in the bargaining unit and their willingness to strike over 
particular issues.53 Each party may accept certain undesirable provi-
sions in the contract in exchange for other provisions that are more 
important or less costly to obtain.54 There is significant pressure for the 
parties to reach agreement because of the substantial cost of failing to do 
so.55 
Once agreement is reached, the parties generally accomplish 
enforcement of the agreement through the internal mechanism of a 
grievance and arbitration procedure. Virtually all collective bargaining 
agreements contain such a procedure, whereby the union, on behalf of 
affected employees, may challenge management actions as violative of 
the agreement. 56 The procedure is usually controlled by the union57 and 
culminates in binding arbitration by a neutral party. 58 Exhaustion of the 
grievance and arbitration procedure is required before an employee, or 
the union, can file suit to enforce the contract.59 The courts give great 
deference to the resolution reached in the grievance and arbitration 
procedure. 60 
The foregoing brief description of the cQllective barga,ining process 
as circumscribed by federal law illustrates that the collective bargaining 
agreement is not the product of two willing parties reaching a voluntary 
BARGAINING 431-34 (1976); see also BRUCE FELDACKER, LABOR GUIDE TO LABOR LAW 180-81 
(West 2d ed. 1983). 
53. See Gorman, supra note 52, at 484. 
54. See Simon, supra note 43, at 961. 
55. See Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 
999, 1004 (1955). The costs of failure to reach agreement may be even greater today than they 
were in the 1950s. See 137 CoNo. REc. S701-03 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1991) (statement of Sen. 
Metzenbaum); 137 CoNG. REc. H2073-75 (daily ed. March 22, 1991) (statement of Cong. 
Owens); 137 CONG. REc. H5518-19 (daily ed. July 17, 1991) (statement of Cong. Moakley), 137 
CoNG. REC. H5528-35 (daily ed. July 17, 1991) (statement of Cong. Ford) (citing to strikes 
involving PATCO, the air traffic controllers union, Continental Air Lines, Phelps Dodge Copper 
Co., International Paper Co. and Greyhound Bus Lines). 
56. Each of 400 sample collective bargaining agreements surveyed by BNA contained 
grievance and arbitration provisions. See Basic Patterns: Grievances and Arbitration, 2 
Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 51:1 (Jan. 23, 1992). 
57. See Gorman, supra note 52, at 541. 
58. See Gorman, supra note 52, at 541-42. 
59. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965). Suits for enforcement 
of the collective bargaining agreement are authorized by Section 301 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 185 (1988). See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 449-50 
(1957). Under limited circumstances-for example, where the union breached its duty of fair 
representation-exhaustion of the grievance procedure is excused. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 
171, 184 (1967). 
60. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960); 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960); 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
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agreement that is mutually beneficial. This understanding is essential to 
an analysis of the liability of the union under the ADA. Also important 
is the extensive regulation of collective bargaining and union-manage-
ment-employee relationships by the NLRA. This regulation has signifi-
cant implications for the interpretation of the ADA in the union setting. 
C. The Union as a Discriminatory Actor 
In some industries, the union's role extends beyond that of negotia-
tor and administrator of the agreement with respect to certain aspects of 
hiring and otherwise determining the terms and conditions of employ-
ment. For example, the union may operate a hiring hall through which 
the employer obtains its employees.61 The collective bargaining agree-
ment may obligate the employer to obtain its employees through the 
hiring hall exclusively, or may allow the employer to seek employees 
from other sources as well. 62 Where the union operates a hiring hall that 
furnishes the employer with employees, the union will be liable for 
intentional discrimination against qualified applicants with disabilities in 
referrals for employment. 63 The union also will be liable if the hiring 
hall utilizes standards, tests, or criteria for referral that screen out indi-
viduals with disabilities, unless the union can establish their job-related-
ness and business necessity. 64 
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, unions have been held 
liable for discrimination in hiring hall referrals. 65 On the other hand, 
referral criteria based on experience have been held lawful even if dis-
criminatory in effect, where they constitute a bona fide seniority sys-
61. Hiring halls are common in the construction and maritime industries, for example. 
ScHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 39, at 619. 
62. See Bullard v. Sercon Corp., 846 F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1988) (nonexclusive hiring hall); 
Boilermakers Local 374 v. NLRB, 852 F.2d 1353, 135.5 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (exclusive hiring hall); 
Martin H. Malin, The Supreme Court and the Duty of Fair Representation, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REv. 127, 162 n.163 (1992) citing Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 6, 493 U.S. 67, 71 n.l 
(1989). 
63. Regardless of the formality of the hiring hall arrangement, unions have been held liable 
for discrimination in the operation of hiring halls under Title VII. MACK A. PLAYER, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 429 (1988). Employers will also be liable for union 
discrimination in hiring halls since discrimination under the ADA includes participating in a 
contractual relationship that subjects the employer's applicants or employees to disability 
discrimination. See ADA§ l02(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990). 
64. See ADA § l02(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. II 1990). 
65. See, e.g., Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Ctr., Inc., 709 F.2d 807, 810 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983); Asbestos Workers. Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 
1969); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 131 (8th Cir. 1969); see also 
Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'! Union of Operating Engineers, 469 F. Supp. 329, 370 (E.D. Pa. 
1978). affd without opinion, 648 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1981). rev'd on other grounds sub nom. 
General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (union liable under Section 
1981 for discriminatory operation of hiring hall). 
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tem.66 These decisions are based on Section 703(h) of Title VII, which 
allows use of a bona fide seniority system even if its effect is to lock 
members of statutorily protected groups into inferior jobs held as a result 
of previous discrimination.67 The ADA has no comparable provision, 
and it might be argued that the omission was intentional. As a result, it 
is unclear whether seniority-based criteria that screen out individuals 
with disabilities because they have been historically excluded will sur-
vive challenge under the ADA, absent proof of job-relatedness and busi-
ness necessity.68 
Unions that discriminate in apprenticeship programs, or use admis-
sions criteria that screen out the disabled and are unjustified by business 
necessity or job relatedness, will also be liable under the ADA.69 Simi-
larly, the union will be liable under the ADA if it discriminates against 
qualified disabled individuals with respect to membership and the dis-
crimination adversely affects job opportunities or any other aspect of 
terms and conditions of employment.70 Although the ADA does not 
expressly prohibit discrimination with respect to membership as does 
Title VII, such discrimination would seem to come within the parame-
ters of the ADA if it has an adverse impact on the individual's 
employment. 71 
66. See, e.g., Hameed v. Iron Workers Local 396, 637 F.2d 506, 516 (8th Cir. 1980). 
67. See Int'I Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349-50 (1977) (interpreting 42 
u.s.c. § 2000e-2(h) (1988)). 
68. See discussion infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text regarding the omission of a 
provision comparable to § 703(h) from the ADA. In contrast to the history of intentional 
discrimination by some unions based on race, gender or ethnicity, intentional discrimination by 
unions against the disabled has been largely absent. It may, therefore, be more difficult to prove 
that a system of seniority-based referrals perpetuates prior discrimination. 
69. Apprenticeship programs are job training. See ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) 
(Supp. II 1990). Cf Hameed v. Iron Workers Local 396, 637 F.2d 506, 510 (8th Cir. 1980) (union 
liable under Title VII and Section 1981 for use of selection criteria for apprenticeship program 
that had a disparate impact on African-Americans); Eldredge v. Carpenters Joint Apprenticeship 
and Training Comm., 833 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1987) Goint labor-management committee 
liable for system of providing apprentices with first jobs that had disparate impact on women). 
70. A denial of membership might reduce an individual's chances for obtaining a job. For 
example, under the NLRA a union may lawfully operate a hiring hall solely for members, so long 
as it is not exclusive and all employers are allowed to hire from other sources. See Penzel 
Construction Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 544 (1970), enfd, 449 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1971). If few 
employers actually hire from other sources, however, lack of union membership may hinder an 
individual's chances for employment. Also, priority of referrals may be lawfully based on 
experience, seniority, or residency requirements that may be correlated with union membership. 
See Hardin, supra note 48, at 1534-36 for a discussion of lawful referral preferences. But see 
supra note 68 and accompanying text regarding the use of seniority-based referral preferences 
under the ADA. 
71. According to Section 102(b )(1 ), discrimination includes "limiting, segregating, or 
classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status 
of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee." ADA 
§ 102(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(l) (Supp. II 1990). 
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D. The Union as a Party to a Discriminatory Contract 
In contrast to the situation that existed prior to 1964 with respect to 
race and gender, collective bargaining agreements do not commonly 
contain provisions expressly discriminating against qualified individuals 
with disabilities.72 An agreement might contain provisions that have the 
effect of discrimination, however. For example, an agreement might 
contain promotion criteria that adversely impact employees with disabil-
ities. Assuming the establishment of the criteria's illegality, the 
employer responsible for utilizing the criteria would be liable. If the 
union played no direct role in implementing the promotional system, the 
question of whether the union violated the ADA would tum on whether 
liability would attach by virtue of the collective bargaining agreement 
alone, or whether the union's role in negotiating the provision was 
relevant. 
There are two statutory provisions specifically addressing employ-
ment criteria. Section 102(b )( 6) prohibits the use of "qualification stan-
dards, employment tests or other selection criteria" that screen out 
individuals with disabilities unless the criteria are job-related and consis-
tent with business necessity. 73 Section 102(b )(7), requires that tests be 
selected and administered to judge the skills that they purport to measure 
and not any impairments of the test taker.74 If neither the union nor the 
collective bargaining agreement plays a role in the discriminatory con-
duct, it seems clear that the union would not be liable. For example, if 
the agreement leaves test administration to the employer's discretion, 
either explicitly or implicitly, and the test administration disadvantages a 
disabled employee such that it does not reflect the employee's job-
related skills,75 then the employer should be solely liable.76 If the agree-
ment specifies use of a test or standard that unjustifiably77 screens out 
72. See Player, supra note 63, at 430 and cases cited therein (unions liable for negotiating 
contract with provisions expressly discriminating on the basis of race, gender, national origin or 
religion). 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. II 1990). 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(7) (Supp. II 1990). 
75. See ADA § 102(b)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(7) (Supp. II 1990). 
76. In an analogous situation under the Rehabilitation Act, the court held that the employer 
was not liable for failure to accommodate where the type of work performed, the gang 
assignments, and job assignments were determined by the union. See Bento v. I.T.O. Corp., 599 
F. Supp. 731, 745 (D.R.I. 1984). Claims relating to testing might arise as claims for failure to 
accommodate the disabled individual in the testing process. See infra notes 130-288 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the accommodation duty. 
77. The effect is unjustifiable if the standard or criterion is not job-related and consistent with 
business necessity. See ADA§ 102(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. II 1990). The burden 
of establishing job-relatedness and business necessity is on the covered entity accused of 
discrimination. See Evan J. Kemp, Jr. & Christopher G. Bell, A Labor Lawyer's Guide to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 15 NovA L. REv. 31, 47 (1991) (Committee reports 
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employees with disabilities; then there is a stronger argument for union 
liability. 78 The question remains whether such liability attaches auto-
matically by virtue of the union's agreement to the contract, or whether 
the union's actions with respect to the particular provision or with 
respect to disability discrimination in general, may absolve the union of 
liability. 
A review of case law under Title VII is useful for comparative anal-
ysis. There are two lines of cases dealing with the issue of union liabil-
ity under Title VII for discrimination caused by the provisions of a 
collective bargaining agreement. One line of cases holds the union lia-
ble solely on the basis that it is a party to the collective bargaining agree-
ment. In Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company,79 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the 
union violated Title VII because the promotion system contained in the 
collective bargaining agreement had a racially discriminatory impact on 
the plaintiffs. The court rejected the union's argument that the employer 
had sole responsibility for promotions, stating that the promotion system 
"is contained in the collective bargaining agreement negotiated in 1967, 
and, therefore, the Brotherhood as well as the railroad can be held liable 
for its discriminatory impact."80 The court's opinion merely quoted 
Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. 81 without further analy-
sis. In Parson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
similarly held a union jointly liable for discrimination caused by the 
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. The court's brief 
rationale noted that it would be "difficult" to impose liability for dis-
crimination caused by an agreement on one party to the agreement and 
not the other.82 The court also pointed out that as representative of the 
black employees, the union had a duty to protect them from invidious 
treatment. 83 
In Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems,84 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit cited this duty to protect the 
indicate that the burden of proof is placed as it is in the regulations implementing Section 504, 
which expressly require employers to justify challenged selection criteria). 
78. The EEOC suggests that a collective bargaining agreement imposing physical 
requirements that screen out qualified applicants with disabilities could be challenged as 
discriminatory. See Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 35, § 7.ll(a), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. 
(BNA) 405:7050. 
79. 678 F.2d 992 (11th Cir. 1982). The union, Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, was also a 
defendant. 
80. 678 F.2d at 1016. 
81. 575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978). 
82. Id. at 1389. 
83. Id. 
84. 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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interests of employees disadvantaged by discrimination in reversing the 
district court's dismissal of a Title VII action against a union co-defend-
ant. The court described a union's duty as "broader than simply refusing 
to sign overtly discriminatory agreements."B5 Albeit in dicta,B6 the court 
stated that where the union has not . negot~ated protection against dis-
crimination for the employees and there is "solid evidence of employer 
discrimination . . . , it would undermine Title VII' s attempt to impose 
responsibility on both unions and employers to hold that union passivity 
at the negotiating table in such circumstances cannot constitute a viola-
tion of the Act."B7 · 
Even those cases that apply a lesser standard of liability effectively 
impose on the union a duty to oppose discriminatory provisions in the 
collective bargaining agreement. Some courts utilize an "efforts" test, 
excusing the union from liability for contract provisions with discrimi-
natory effects where it actively opposed the relevant provisions.BB 
Under this test, the union must make all reasonable efforts to eliminate 
the discriminatory provisions in order to avoid liability. B9 
This duty appears to emanate from the union's duty of fair repre-
sentation,90 a judicially created duty derived from the union's right to 
exclusive representation under the NLRA.91 The duty of fair representa-
tion requires the union to represent the interests of all employees in the 
· 85. Id. at 989. 
86. The court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal on the basis of timeliness and 
estoppel, and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 985, 997. 
87. Id. at 989. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit relied on this duty 
to impose liability on a union for a discriminatory contract provision in Patterson v. American 
Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 270 (4th Cir. 1976) .. 
88. See, e.g., Waker v. Republic Steel Corp., 675 F.2d 91, 93 (5th Cir. 1982); Terrell v. 
United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 644 F.2d 1112, 1120-21 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted and 
judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Int') Molders & Allied Workers Union Local 342 v. 
Terrell, 456 U.S. 968 (1982). The union's efforts may result in the conclusion that it did not 
violate the statute, or in the imposition of injunctive relief only, with no liability for monetary 
damages. See Martinez v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 680 F. Supp. 1377, 1397-98 (N.D. Cal. 1987); 
Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474, 503 (E.D. Va. 1978), aff din part, rev'd in 
part, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980). 
89. See Howard v. Int'I Molders & Allied Workers Local 100, 779 F.2d 1546, 1548 (11th Cir. 
1986) (union did not take every reasonable step to insure compliance with Title VII); Waker, 675 
F.2d at 93 (the union made every reasonable effort to insure compliance, since the union's efforts 
need not include a strike over the issue in order to be reasonable). In Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 
444 F.2d 791 (1971), however, the Fourth Circuit suggested otherwise. The court, in rejecting the 
employer's defense that avoidance of union pressure was a legitimate business purpose justifying 
the adverse racial impact of an employment practice, stated: "Title VII requires that union and 
employer represent and protect the best interest of minority employees. Despite the fact that a 
strike over a contract provision may impose economic costs, if a discriminatory contract provision 
is acceded to the bargainee as well as the bargainor will be held liable." Id. at 799 (footnote 
omitted). 
90. Simon, supra note 43, at 969. 
91. See id. at 963-64. The same duty is imposed by the Railway Labor Act. Id. 
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bargaining unit without discrimination or arbitrary treatment.92 Critics 
of the imposition of such a duty under Title VII point out the differences 
between Title VII and the NLRA, and further note that Title VII 
expressly bars the union from causing or attempting to cause the 
employer to discriminate. 93 This language does not suggest a duty on 
the part of the union to prevent employer discrimination.94 Accordingly, 
the union should not be liable for discrimination caused by the collective 
bargaining agreement unless a causal connection between the union's 
actions and the discrimination exists. This approach considers the real-
ity of the union's role in negotiations. 
The contrary argument, for imposing liability where the contract 
results in discrimination regardless of the union's role, posits that a strict 
liability standard will force the union to oppose discriminatory provi-
sions more stringently, even to the point of striking.95 It is suggested 
that such an approach will further Title VII' s goal of eliminating dis-
crimination. 96 Advocates of this approach reconcile it with the causation 
requirement in Title VII by arguing that the union binds the employer to 
discriminate by acquiescing to a discriminatory contract, thus causing 
discrimination. 97 
Analysis of union liability under the ADA is not limited by lan-
guage regarding causation of employer discrimination. The language of 
the ADA differs from Title VII in that it imposes the same requirements 
on unions and employers. Inclusion of the union as a covered entity 
directly prohibited from using employment criteria with a disparate 
impact supports liability based on agreement to a contract clause provid-
ing for use of discriminatory criteria. On the other hand, one might 
argue that only the employer "uses" qualification standards or other 
selection criteria when the employer administers the standards mandated 
by the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, only the employer should 
be liable when it applies the criteria and selects employees based on 
whether the criteria are met. The statutory language and regulations 
92. Id. at 964. 
93. See id. at 971-72. 
94. The Supreme Court's decision in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987), 
casts doubt on the persuasive value of this argument to the courts. There the Court found the 
union liable for race discrimination for refusing to file grievances alleging race discrimination, 
despite the fact that there was no racial animus on the part of the union. Id. at 669. In addition, 
the Court rejected the union's argument that the only basis for liability was § 703(c)(3) which 
requires causation of employer discrimination. The Court based its finding of liability on 
§ 703(c)(l) which bars the union from otherwise discriminating. Id. at 667. 
95. See Note, Union Liability for Employer Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. REv. 702, 704-07 
(1980). 
96. Id. at 706-07. 
97. Id. at 705. 
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arguably support limiting liability to the employer, for they make clear 
that the imposition of liability on the covered entity is only for discrimi-
nation against the covered entity's own employees; a covered entity has 
no liability for the actions of the other party to the contract towards its 
employees.98 Thus, the union would have no responsibility for discrimi-
nation against the employees of the employer resulting from the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 
Such an approach, however, ignores the role of the union in negoti-
ating the contract provision that results in discrimination. Clearly the 
employer cannot defend against its own liability on the basis that use of 
the selection criteria is required by the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 99 Yet the union still may be liable for a discriminatory contract 
provision by virtue of its role as representative of the employees. 100 
The union may have insisted that a discriminatory provision be 
included in the agreement or acquiesced to the employer's insistence on 
inclusion, either with indifference or after a struggle based on either the 
union's opposition to inclusion or a desire to obtain a concession from 
the employer in exchange for inclusion. In addition, the union's opposi-
tion to inclusion of the clause at issue may have been based on the dis-
criminatory impact of the provision or upon some reason wholly 
unrelated to discrimination. 
Given the realities of the union's role in negotiating contracts, 101 it 
seems intuitively correct that the union's liability should be determined 
by its actions, rather than merely by its signature on the contract. The 
union simply has no power to compel agreement to provisions that the 
employees refuse to strike to obtain. 102 The only alternatives available 
to the union are capitulation to the provisions or refusal to agree, leaving 
all employees without the protection and benefits of the collectively bar-
gained agreement. Nevertheless, the efforts test, properly applied, has 
the virtue of encouraging unions to police agreements for provisions that 
98. See ADA § 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6 
(1992). 
99. See ADA § 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990). 
100. The issue of union liability should arise only when the individual files an EEOC charge 
and subsequent lawsuit against the union. The Supreme Court held in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. 
Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 96-97 (1981), that employers have no right to 
contribution from unions that allegedly have partial responsibility for violations of Title VII. 
Since the ADA contains no express right of contribution and the enforcement and remedial 
provisions are patterned after Title VII, the same conclusion regarding the right to contribution 
should obtain. 
101. See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text. 
102. See Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474, 503 (E.D. Va. 1978), aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (union found guilty of discrimination based on 
contract, but because the union was virtually powerless to alter the company's unilaterally 
imposed policy, to which it acquiesced under protest, union not liable for back pay). 
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might have a discriminatory impact, to place their negotiating strength 
behind elimination of discrimination, and to attempt to convince their 
membership to support the rights of the disabled. 103 
The difficulty with a liability rule based on the union's efforts to 
achieve nondiscrimination is in its application by the courts. The 
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), despite its presumed exper-
tise in labor relations issues, has problems evaluating the conduct of 
parties in contract negotiations and determining whether they have bar-
gained in good faith. 104 It may be equally difficult for courts to decide 
whether a union's efforts in negotiations are sufficient to relieve it of 
liability for a discriminatory contract provision. A rule imputing auto-
matic liability would be far easier to apply. 
There are several factors, however, that courts could use to assist 
them in determining union responsibility for discriminatory contract 
provisions. First, if the union actively sought or agreed without hesita-
tion to a clause prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability, that 
action should mitigate against union liability. 105 Second, if the union 
proposed and supported nondiscriminatory selection criteria or actively 
opposed discriminatory selection criteria, even short of a strike or major 
economic concessions, such action supports the conclusion that the 
union is not liable. 106 Third, union efforts to challenge discrimination 
through the grievance procedure or through the administrative and judi-
cial processes, particularly a challenge to contract language agreed to 
under protest, would support the conclusion that the union's resistance 
to discrimination was more than perfunctory. 107 Presence of each of 
103. The rule advantages larger unions with sophisticated legal resources. Smaller, less 
sophisticated unions may not anticipate potential disability issues and respond to them effectively. 
104. See Gorman, supra note 52, at 481-84, and cases cited therein. 
105. See Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (where the 
union has not proposed nondiscrimination language and has remained silent in negotiations in the 
face of strong evidence of employer discrimination, the union violates Title VII). Generally one 
would not expect active employer opposition to confirming its nondiscrimination obligation under 
the ADA in the collective bargaining agreement. See Hardin, supra note 48, at 901 ("Elimination 
of invidious forms of discrimination in the bargaining unit is a mandatory subject of bargaining 
and contract provisions prohibiting discrimination on invidious bases have become commonplace 
in labor agreements." (citations omitted)). Employer opposition to such a clause might further 
support imposing full liability on the employer for discrimination, while excusing the union from 
responsibility. 
106. Cf. Waker v. Republic Steel Corp., 675 F.2d 91, 93 (5th Cir. 1982) (union efforts to 
negotiate changes in discriminatory practices relieve it of liability even though it refused to strike 
over the issue); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 472 F. Supp. 1304, 1354 (E.D. Pa. 1979) 
(no union liability where union attempted to limit use of discriminatory tests in negotiations, 
succeeding in part, filed grievances over the use of the tests and pursued them to arbitration, and 
opposed the use of the tests in court). 
107. See Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474, 503 (E.D. Va. 1978), aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), where the court declined to assess back pay 
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these three factors should relieve the union of liability. 108 
Furthermore, the courts should use discretion to determine whether 
it is appropriate to absolve the union of liability where the union's con-
duct indicates active opposition to discrimination although none of the 
three factors are present. 109 There is significant pressure on the union to 
achieve a collective bargaining agreement to protect employees. Not 
only does failure to reach an agreement leave employees unprotected in 
many ways, 110 but it leaves the union vulnerable to decertification. 111 
Where a union capitulates to what turns out to be a discriminatory provi-
sion in order to reach an agreement, the union should not be held liable 
unless its resistance to the provision was merely token. 112 
against the union which had begun to "whittle away" at discriminatory practices "in a logical 
progression," initiating "the only bona fide efforts to secure for women flight attendants the right 
to continue working during pregnancy." Id. Efforts by the particular union in support of the ADA 
might be considered as well. See Waker, 675 F.2d at 93-94 (union's active and persistent efforts 
to increase job opportunities for black employees supports decision against liability); Dickerson, 
472 F. Supp. at 1354 (union's opposition to discriminatory tests in court cases, including filing an 
amicus brief in Griggs, supports conclusion that union is not liable). 
108. This test for liability imposes on the union an arguably unjustified affirmative duty to seek 
nondiscriminatory contract provisions, see Simon, supra note 43, at 981, but the inclusion of the 
union as a covered entity subject to all the nondiscrimination provisions of the ADA supports such 
a test. 
109. For example, ·the union may agree to a provision regarding examinations that is later 
revealed to have discriminatory effects. If the union either proposes a reasonable accommodation 
that would eliminate the discriminatory effects, or grieves the employer's discriminatory 
application of the provision, the union should be absolved of liability despite its initial agreement 
to the contract provision with unanticipated discriminatory effects. 
110. During negotiations, unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment are 
unlawful even where they benefit the employees. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962). 
Thus, the employees cannot receive any pay increases or additional benefits until either a contract 
or an impasse is reached. Id. at 745. After an impasse, the employer can implement its last offer 
to the union, which may increase or decrease pay and benefits. Id. at 745. If the contract is a first 
contract, the employees will have no existing grievance and arbitration procedure with which to 
challenge employer actions and no protection against unjust discipline. Even if an expired 
contract contains such protections, the employer is not obligated to arbitrate many issues after 
contract expiration, further eroding the employees' protection. See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. 
NLRB, - U.S.-, lll S. Ct. 2215, 2224 (1991). A strike, of course, leaves the employees 
vulnerable to permanent replacement. See supra note 50. 
111. A petition for decertification; or certification of another union, can be filed during the 
window period ninety to sixty days before expiration of a contract or after contract expiration if no 
new agreement has been reached. See Leonard Wholesale Meats Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962). 
In addition, a newly certified union has a one year period in which to reach agreement. After 
expiration of the certification year, if no agreement has been reached, a petition for decertification 
or certification of another union can be filed. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 97 (1954). 
112. If the costs of failing to agree were not so high, and the sanctions for unlawful refusals to 
bargain more effective, a different rule might be appropriate. Under current law, however, the 
employer could obstruct agreement by insistence on contractual provisions that would have a 
discriminatory impact on the disabled, with virtually no consequences under the NLRA. A charge 
of bargaining in bad faith could take years to litigate and the only remedy is an order to bargain, 
starting the process over again. Hardin, supra note 48, at 1844. In the meantime, the union would 
be left with the choice of remaining without a contract, leaving the employees unprotected and the 
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Of course, the court should give the union credit only for sincere 
efforts to oppose discrimination. Courts can assess the genuineness of 
the union's opposition to discrimination both by the importance that the 
union places on nondiscriminatory contract provisions in negotiations 113 
and by the nature of the discriminatory provision. Most of the cases 
under Title VII imposing liability on the union based on the collective 
bargaining agreement have involved seniority systems, contract provi-
sions likely to have resulted from union demands. 114 When a testing or 
other selection criterion is involved, it is more likely to have resulted 
from employer demands. In such a case, the court should more reluc-
tantly assess union liability, absent clear evidence of the union's role as 
a discriminatory actor. As is the case under Title VII, 115 the courts in 
these cases should determine whether the union's anti-discrimination 
efforts warrant relief from liability, or merely relief from monetary 
damages. 
A final argument, unique to the ADA, that might support union 
liability is that the union has a duty to accommodate employees or appli-
cants with disabilities. 116 This duty arguably includes either modifying 
a contract with discriminatory effects or waiving compliance with con-
union vulnerable to decertification, or agreeing to a discriminatory provision that would impose 
liability under the ADA. See Stephen I. Schlossberg & John Silard, The Need for A 
Compensatory Remedy in Refusal-To-Bargain Cases, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1059 (1968) and Arnold 
Ordman, The National Labor Relations Act: Current Developments, Proceedings of New York 
University Twenty-Fourth Annual Conference on Labor 115, 126-28 (l 972) for discussions of the 
delay and remedial problems under the NLRA. The statute has not been amended to deal with the 
problems discussed since that time. See Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act 
Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 397, 432-33 (1992). 
There is unlikely to be collusion between the company and the union under the efforts test 
because only the union escapes liability. Thus the company will not allow the union to orchestrate 
a scenario where it appears to support nondiscrimination, but does so ineffectively. Such a 
strategy would increase the employer's potential liability, while absolving the union. 
113. Importance can be determined by the frequency of discussion, the length of time the 
proposal remains on the table, and what the union is willing to give up to obtain the proposal. But 
see Thomas H. Christopher & Charles M. Rice, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An 
Overview of the Employment Provisions, 33 S. TEX. L. REv. 759, 782 (1992), for an argument that 
neither party should be required to make concessions in negotiations to obtain compliance with 
the ADA. The courts should take care not to require more on the part of the union than is 
reasonable, because the union is limited by the desires of its membership. See I.I. Case Co. v. 
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944) (''The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective 
agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect 
the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group."); Strick Corp., 241 
N.L.R.B. 210, 220 (1979) (union did not breach its duty of fair representation by agreement which 
favored interests of only group in a position to "impose economic restraints upon the Employer in 
the event of impasse" and impaired interests of group that was not). 
114. See Simon, supra note 43, at 984. 
115. See supra note 88. 
116. See discussion infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text regarding whether the union has 
a duty of accommodation. 
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tractual provisions that cause discrimination. 117 The duty to accommo-
date applies to "known" physical or mental limitations, however, so that 
the duty to accommodate does not arise until the employee requests 
accommodation or the union and employer otherwise become aware of 
the need for accommodation. 118 Thus, even if the duty to accommodate 
requires contract modification or waiver, the duty would not arise until 
the union actually knew of the discrimination caused by the contractual 
provision. Furthermore, if the union could establish undue hardship, no 
accommodation would be required.119 Accordingly, the efforts test is 
the most appropriate measure of union liability for contract provisions 
with discriminatory effects. 
E. The Union as a Grievance Representative 
A union's duty of fair representation arises not only in the context 
of negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, but also in its 
enforcement. 120 Under Title VII and section 1981,121 unions have been 
held liable for discrimination in handling grievances. 122 Since access to 
the grievance procedure is a term, condition or privilege of employment 
which is controlled by the union, discriminatory refusal to pursue a 
grievance based on the grievant's disability violates the ADA. 123 It is 
not unusual for a contractual grievance to involve an issue relating to the 
employee's disability. 124 For example, an employee's own physician 
might release the employee to work after an illness or injury, while the 
117. While neither contractual modification nor waiver is mentioned in the statutory list of 
accommodations, the list is not exclusive. Moreover, the accommodations listed might well 
require contract modification since job descriptions, work schedules, job assignments, and training 
programs may be incorporated into collective bargaining agreements. See further discussion of 
the issues posed by conflict between accommodations and the collective bargaining agreement 
infra notes 138-288 and accompanying text. 
118. ADA§ 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990); S. REP. No. 116, supra 
note 2, at 34; H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), supra note 17, at 65, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
347. 
119. ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990). See infra notes 134-
288 and accompanying text for more extensive discussion of the application of the 
accommodation duty to unions and the circumstances under which liability would attach. 
120. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Section 1981 prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of race. 
122. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987) (union violated Title VII 
and § 1981 by failing to process grievances asserting racial discrimination.) Unions are frequently 
accused of failing to pursue a grievance because of the race, gender or ethnicity of the grievant. 
See Gorman, supra note 52, at 705-07 and cases cited therein. 
123. See ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 1990). 
124. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187 (1967) (suit for breach of contract against the 
employer and breach of the duty of fair representation against the union based on dispute over the 
discharge of an employee with high blood pressure for alleged inability to work). Disability 
related issues under the collective bargaining agreement might also arise with respect to medical 
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employer's physician might find the employee unable to perform con-
tractual duties. 125 If the employee grieved the employer's refusal of 
reinstatement and the union decided not to pursue the grievance, the 
employee might charge both the union and the employer with disability 
discrimination. 
If the court found that the employer discriminated against the 
employee under the ADA, would the union also be liable for its decision 
to drop the grievance? Based on analogy to Title VII, the employee 
would have to show that the union engaged in intentional discrimination 
based on the employee's disability. 126 If the union proffers evidence of 
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action, e.g., a belief that it 
would not prevail on the merits, then the employee would have to estab-
lish that the reason was a pretext for discrimination. 127 In the absence of 
statements indicating hostility toward the employee or other employees 
with disabilities, or evidence that employees in similar circumstances 
without disabilities were treated more favorably, proof of pretext would 
be difficult. 128 If, however, the union fails to make efforts to remedy the 
employer's disability discrimination that is prohibited by the collective 
bargaining agreement, then the union may also be liable for disability 
discrimination. 129 Most courts, however, would require a pattern of 
such refusals to establish the requisite intentional discrimination. 
Other issues relating to the duty. of fair representation are signifi-
cantly intertwined with the duty of reasonable accommodation estab-
lished by the ADA and will be discussed in the following section. 
or dependent care leaves, discipline for absenteeism, light duty for injured employees, and 
benefits such as health insurance and pensions. 
125. See id. at 174. 
126. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 39, at 629-30 and cases cited therein (complaints of 
discrimination in grievance handling are based on disparate treatment theory and require proof of 
intentional discrimination). 
127. Loretta K. Haggard, Reasonable Accommodation of Individuals with Mental Disabilities 
and Psychoactive Substance Use Disorders Under Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 
43 WASH. U. J. URe. & CoN'!'EMP. L. 343, 351 (1993). As Haggard notes, however, at least one 
court has held that the defendant has a burden of proof rather than production once the plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 
(10th Cir. 1981). 
128. Alternatively, the employee might be able to establish disparate treatment between 
disabilities. For example, an employee with a particularly feared disease, such as AIDS, or who is 
even merely HIV+, might be treated less favorably than an employee with heart disease, thus 
establishing disability discrimination. 
129. Cf Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 668 (1987) (union that declined to 
pursue racial discrimination grievances against employer liable despite lack of animus and 
otherwise nondiscriminatory treatment of African-Americans). If the union has no vehicle for 
challenging disability discrimination under the collective bargaining agreement, it may be 
absolved from this risk of liability. But failure to negotiate a nondiscrimination clause may 
subject the union to a greater risk of· liability for discrimination caused by provisions of the 
contract. See supra notes 72-119 and accompanying text. 
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F. The Union and the Duty of Reasonable Accommodation 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the employment provisions 
of the ADA is the duty of reasonable accommodation. 130 In passing the 
ADA, Congress viewed the primary problem as one of barrier discrimi-
nation, discrimination based on indifference and thoughtlessness rather 
than hostility. 131 Thus the ADA requires covered entities to make rea-
sonable accommodations that will enable a disabled employee to work. 
The statute contains a nonexclusive list of reasonable accommodations 
which includes making facilities accessible, job restructuring, modifying 
work schedules, reassignment to vacant positions, acquiring or modify-
ing equipment, modifying tests and training programs, providing readers 
and interpreters, or other similar accommodations. 132 An accommoda-
tion need not be made, however, if it would result in undue hardship "on 
the operation of the business of the covered entity."133 
The inclusion of unions in the definition of "covered entity" sug-
gests that the union, like the employer, has a duty of reasonable accom-
modation. Yet the language regarding undue hardship suggests that only 
employers are covered, since unions do not operate businesses. The 
EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual states that unions have an accom-
modation obligation, 134 but there is no reference to such an obligation in 
the Regulations. 135 By analogy, Title VII also supports imposing a duty 
to accommodate on the union. Title VII requires reasonable accommo-
dation of an employee's religious observance or practice.136 Although 
the statutory requirement refers only to employers, courts and the EEOC 
have interpreted the law to mandate accommodation by unions as 
well. 137 Given the incorporation of unions as covered entities in the 
ADA and this interpretation of Title VII, the more persuasive argument 
is that the accommodation obligation applies to unions. 
The primary context in which the accommodation issue would arise 
130. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 33, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 349. 
("Reasonable accommodation is a key requirement of the Rehabilitation Act and of this Act.") 
131. Ervin, supra note 38, at 962. 
132. See ADA§ 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. II 1990). 
133. See ADA§ 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990). 
134. See Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 35, at§§ 3.9, 7.ll(a), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. 
(BNA) 405:7007, 405:7050. 
135. In its Overview of the Regulations, the EEOC indicated the "collective bargaining 
agreement matters" were so complex that they required extensive research and analysis and 
further consideration. Accordingly, the Commission decided to leave such matters for "in depth" 
discussion in "future Compliance Manual sections and policy guidances". 56 Fed. Reg. 35727 
(July 26, 1991). 
136. 42 u.s.c. § 7010) (1988). 
137. See infra note 163 and cases cited therein; McDaniel v. Essex Int'I, Inc., 696 F.2d 34, 35 
(6th Cir. 1982); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1981); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1605.2(d) (1992). 
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for the union would be where one or more possible accommodations 
would either conflict with the collective bargaining agreement or impact 
terms and conditions of employment, thereby requiring negotiation with 
the union. For example, a disabled employee might desire to transfer to 
a vacant position with duties that the employee could perform, but might 
have insufficient seniority to obtain the position under the collective bar-
gaining agreement. Alternatively, an employee might request restructur-
ing of a position, the duties of which are defined in a collective 
bargaining agreement or fixed by past practice. 138 
The regulations address the issue briefly, but provide no definitive 
guidance, merely noting in the Appendix that the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement "may be relevant" to determining whether an 
accommodation would be unduly disruptive to the employees or the 
business. 139 Such disruption would constitute undue hardship which 
eliminates the accommodation obligation. 140 The Technical Assistance 
Manual takes a similar approach, and provides additional "advice" to 
avoid the problem.141 The Manual suggests that the employer should 
consult with the union to work out an accommodation, and further 
advises that to avoid continuing conflicts with the collective bargaining 
agreement, "employers" should seek a contract clause permitting them 
to take all action necessary to comply with the ADA. 142 
Setting aside for the moment the EEOC's recommendations regard-
ing avoidance of conflict, it is useful to look at cases applying the 
accommodation obligations under the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII in 
the context of a conflicting collective bargaining agreement in order to 
analyze the possible results under the ADA. 
1. THE REHABILITATION ACT CASES 
As noted previously, the legislative history clearly indicates that the 
138. A past practice can become a binding term and condition of employment even where it is 
not expressly embodied in the collective bargaining agreement. See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA 
ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 437 (4th ed. 1985). Many other possible 
accommodations that impact terms and conditions of employment are readily apparent. Having a 
supervisor perform nonessential functions of a disabled employee's position might violate a 
contractual prohibition on supervisors performing bargaining unit work. A disabled employee 
might require breaks in excess of those specified in the agreement. An employee with a disability 
might need medical leave in excess of that permitted by the agreement. 
139. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d), app. (1992). Notably this section refers to proof by the 
employer of undue hardship. 
140. See ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990). 
141. See Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 35, at § 3.9, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 
405:7007. 
142. See id. This suggestion was also made by Congress. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, 
at 32; H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), supra note 17, at 63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 346. 
This recommendation is discussed infra notes 240-47 and accompanying text. 
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ADA is patterned after the Rehabilitation Act and its regulations. Fed-
eral courts faced with Rehabilitation Act claims for accommodation of a 
disabled employee that conflict with the requirements of a collective 
bargaining agreement have uniformly held that such accommodation is 
not required. 143 Shea v. Tisch 144 is a typical case. In Shea, the employee 
argued that he should have been reassigned to a position that would be 
143. The only decision to the contrary was made by a special panel certified by the Merit 
Systems Protection Board, which deferred to the EEOC holding that the employer must consider 
reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, despite the contrary provisions of the collective 
bargaining agreement. See Ignacio v. United States Postal Serv., 30 M.S.P.R. 471, 486-87 (Spec. 
Pan. 1986). The courts considering the decision have not found it persuasive. See Carter v. Tisch, 
822 F.2d 465, 468 (4th Cir. 1987) ('The position taken by the EEOC and deferred to by the 
Special Panel in Ignacio has been firmly rejected by the courts which have considered it." 
(citations omitted)). 
In a later decision, Konieczko v. United States Postal Serv., 47 M.S.P.R. 509 (MSPB 1991), 
the Merit Systems Protection Board cited three unpublished EEOC decisions holding that "where 
an agency demonstrates that its nondiscriminatory collective bargaining agreement precludes it 
from reassigning an individual with a handicap to another position, such evidence is sufficient to 
establish that the reassignment would place an undue hardship on the agency." Id. at 514-15. 
Noting that the holding was a departure from Ignacio, the Board deferred to the EEOC's position 
because it was an interpretation of discrimination law which was not "so unreasonable as to 
violate civil service law." Id. at 515. The Board went on to state that "[t]he Board's prior 
decisions which held that the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement cannot override the 
agency's obligations under the Rehabilitation Act are modified consistent with this Opinion and 
Order." Id. The Board held, however, that Konieczko was entitled to reassignment since it was· 
not precluded by the collective bargaining agreement, which merely accorded a preference to 
employees in another job classification. Id. at 515. The Board followed Konieczko in Podrazik v. 
United States Postal Serv., 54 M.S.P.R. 380, 384 (M.S.P.B. 1992), holding that the employer 
demonstrated undue hardship where the collective bargaining agreement precluded the 
reassignment sought as an accommodation. 
In a July 1993 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a 
memorandum of understanding that was part of the collective bargaining agreement did not 
preclude transferring an employee as an accommodation because the memorandum did not 
prohibit transfers of employees with less than one year of seniority. See Buckingham v. United 
States Postal Serv., No. 91-56236, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17225 (9th Cir. July 13, 1993). In 
Buckingham, the agreement reserved one of every four positions for transfers with at least one 
year of seniority. Id. at * 15. The agreement also expressly allowed EEO factors to be considered 
in filling the positions and further permitted the transfer preference to be overridden "in the most 
unusual of circumstances." Id. at *15, *16. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's 
conclusion that the transfer of Buckingham, who only had five months seniority, was not barred 
by the agreement. Id. at * 17. The court distinguished the case from other cases under the 
Rehabilitation Act because the transfer to accommodate Buckingham's disability "would not 
'usurp the legitimate rights of other employees under a collective bargaining agreement.'" Id. at 
*16 (quoting Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1987)). 
The EEOC recently promulgated a regulation under Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act 
requiring federal employers to reassign nonprobationary employees unable to perform the 
essential functions of their existing positions to vacant positions in which they can perform the 
essential functions, unless the employer can show undue hardship. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(g) 
(1992). The regulation exempts the Postal Service from reassignment inconsistent with the terms 
of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. See further discussion of this regulation infra note 179. 
144. 870 F.2d 786 (!st Cir. 1989). 
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closer to his home and require only weekday work. 145 The employer did 
not dispute that his disability required such an assignment, but argued 
that it could not provide the plaintiff with such a position because it 
would violate the collective bargaining agreement's requirement that 
jobs be awarded on the basis of seniority. 146 The court concluded that 
the employer "was not required to accommodate plaintiff further by 
placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights 
of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement."147 The 
Fourth, 148 Sixth149 and Tenth15° Circuits, along with a number of district 
courts, 151 have reached similar conclusions. 
The cases so deciding do not contain extensive rationales. 152 Since 
most cases simply reason that overriding the collective bargaining agree-
ment would adversely impact the rights of other employees secured by 
the agreement, it appears that the courts have concluded that the exist-
ence of a conflicting collective bargaining agreement renders the accom-
modation unreasonable or constitutes undue hardship. 153 A few cases 
145. Id. at 789. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 790. 
148. See Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467-68 (4th Cir. 1987) (reassignment not required 
accommodation unless it would be available under the employer's existing policies, and here, the 
collective bargaining agreement barred reassignment to light duty for employees with less than 
five years seniority). See also Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., No. 92-9308, 1993 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 16259 (2d Cir. July 2, 1993) (while employer not obligated to reassign disabled employee, 
the employer "cannot deny an employee alternative employment opportunities reasonably 
available under the employer's existing policies"). Id. at *22. 
149. See Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1251-52 (6th Cir. 1985) (even if 
employee was a qualified disabled individual, he was not entitled to reassignment or job 
restructuring which would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining 
agreement). 
150. See Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984) (where 
collective bargaining agreement barred both job restructuring and reassignment to permanent light 
duty position, employer's contractual obligations to union and employees provide legitimate 
business reason for discharging employee who could not perform the job for which she was 
hired). 
151. See, e.g., Davis v. United States Postal Se..V., 675 F. Supp. 225, 233 (M.D. Pa. 1987); 
Hurst v. United States Postal Serv., 653 F. Supp. 259, 261 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Carty v. Carlin, 623 
F. Supp. 1181, 1189 (D. Md. 1985); Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 927 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
152. See Kenneth Allen Greene, Burdens of Proving Handicap Discrimination Using Federal 
Employment Discrimination Law: Rational Basis or Undue Burden, 3 DET. C.L. REv. 1053, 
1089-1103 ( 1989) for a general criticism of the courts for failing to analyze cases under the 
Rehabilitation Act adequately, and a specific critique of the analyses in the cases involving 
collective bargaining agreements and accommodation. 
153. See, e.g., Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (!st Cir. 1989) (''To give plaintiff such a new 
position would violate the collective bargaining rights of other employees .... "); Carter, 822 
F.2d at 467 ("Reassigning Carter to permanent light duty, when he was not entitled to one of a 
limited number of light duty positions, might have interfered with the rights of other employees 
under the collective bargaining agreement."); Jasany, 155 F.2d at 1251-52 ("An employer cannot 
be required to accommodate a handicapped employee by restructuring a job in a manner which 
1994] ADA AND UNIONS 593 
contain additional analysis. In Hurst v. United States Postal Service, 154 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia not 
only relied on the impact on other employees, but also held that Con-
gress intended to incorporate in the Rehabilitation Act the protection for 
bona fide seniority systems contained in Title VII. 155 Thus, the Rehabil-
itation Act, like Title VII, required that the rights under the seniority 
system, which was not created with the intent to discriminate, prevail 
over the right of reasonable accommodation. 156 
In Bey v. Bolger, 157 the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania found that ari accommodation that violated the 
collective bargaining agreement would cause undue hardship for the 
employer. The court analyzed the relevant provision of the collective 
bargaining agreement, which restricted light duty assignments to 
employees with five years of service, and found that it was reasonable 
and substantially related to the legitimate government purpose of accom-
modating employees while maintaining a high level of efficiency at a 
would usurp the legitimate rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement."); 
Daubert, 733 F.2d at 1370 ("USPS's contractual obligations to its employees and their union 
under the collective bargaining agreement clearly ~culates [sic] a legitimate business reason for 
Daubert's discharge [for inability to perform the duties of her position due to her disability]."); 
Carty, 623 F. Supp. at 1189 (employer not required to reassign an employee as a reasonable 
accommodation where it might violate the rights of other employees secured by a collective 
bargaining agreement). 
As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently noted, the 
concepts of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship merge at times and the distinction 
between them may not be altogether clear. See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
("As a general matter, a reasonable accommodation is one employing a method of accommodation 
that is reasonable in the run of cases, whereas the undue hardship inquiry focuses on the hardships 
imposed by the plaintiffs preferred accommodation in the context of the particular agency's 
operations."). While the distinction may not be significant in many cases, it may be important in 
cases involving allocation of the burdens of proof. See id. 
154. 653 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Ga. 1986). 
155. Id. at 262. Section 703(h) of Title VII states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, 
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide 
seniority or merit system ... provided that such differences are not the result of an 
intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2h (1988). In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 
353 (1977), the Supreme Court held that it was not unlawful to utilize a seniority system that did 
not have its genesis in discrimination, despite the fact that the system perpetuated pre-Act 
discrimination. 
In incorporating § 703(h) into the Rehabilitation Act, the court relied on Skillern v. Bolger, 
725 F.2d 1121 (7th Cir. 1984), where the court read Title VII's provisions regarding conflicts with 
veteran's preference laws into the Rehabilitation Act to further the intent of Congress. Id. at 1123. 
156. Hurst v. United States Postal Serv., 653 F. Supp. 259, 263 (N.D. Ga. 1986). 
157. 540 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
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reasonable cost. 158 According to this court's analysis, it is not merely 
the existence of the conflict, but the legitimacy of the provision's pur-
pose that is relevant. 159 
In Davis v. United States Postal Service, 160 another Pennsylvania 
district court used a somewhat different analysis to reach the same 
result. The Davis court held that the statute did not require the employer 
to reassign an employee as an accommodation unless the employer had a 
policy of reassignment that was discriminatorily denied to the plain-
tiff.161 Since the collective bargaining agreement required the employer 
to fill job vacancies by seniority, the employer was not required to reas-
sign Davis to a position to which he was not entitled on the basis of 
seniority. 162 
2. TITLE VII AND ACCOMMODATION 
Accommodation cases under Title VII provide further useful infor-
mation for analytical purposes. Title VIl's only accommodation require-
ment is for religious beliefs and practices.163 The United States 
Supreme Court addressed this provision in TWA v. Hardison. 164 The 
employee in Hardison sought an accommodation permitting him to 
refrain from working on the Sabbath, which was Saturday in his reli-
gion. 165 Hardison did not have sufficient seniority to avoid Saturday 
work, and the union was unwilling to agree to any violation of the agree-
158. Id. at 927. The court noted that it was necessary for efficiency and productivity to limit 
the number of light duty assignments. Id. 
159. The Carter court, in stating that a duty to reassign would not defeat the requirements of a 
collective bargaining agreement unless the agreement had the effect or intent of discrimination, 
may have been suggesting a similar limitation. 822 F.2d at 469. 
160. 675 F. Supp. 225 (M.D. Pa. 1987). 
161. Id. at 235. The court in Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181, 1188 (D. Md. 1985), also 
noted the absence of a duty to reassign in finding that accommodation was not required. 
162. Davis, 675 F. Supp. at 235. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether the 
collective bargaining agreement prevailed over the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 235 n.9. The court 
also rejected the plaintiffs argument that the employer's statutory affirmative action obligation 
mandated reassignment. Id. at 235. 
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988). While Title VII expressly requires religious accommodation 
only by the employer, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988), the courts have interpreted the statute to 
require accommodation by unions as well. See, e.g., EEOC v. Caribe Hilton Int'I, 597 F. Supp. 
1007, 1013 (D.P.R. 1984); Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 884 (9th Cir. 
1980); Bums v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 589 F.2d 403, 404 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). In assessing the union's liability, courts have found the union 
liable for intentional actions that prevent or obstruct accommodation by the employer. See 
Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 487 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); 
Hardison v. Trans World Air Lines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 42-43 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other 
grounds, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
164. 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
165. Id. at 68. 
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ment' s seniority provisions. TWA declined to take unilateral action in 
violation of the collective bargaining agreement. 
The Court found that the duty to accommodate did not require the 
employer to take action inconsistent with the agreement, noting that "[i]t 
would be anomalous to conclude that by 'reasonable accommodation' 
Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference 
of some employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, 
in order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others .... " 166 
The Court further stated that section 703(h) of the statute, which affords 
special protection for seniority systems, supported this conclusion. 167 
The Court overruled the appellate court's conclusion that the seniority 
system did not limit accommodation, stating that that ruling was "plainly 
inconsistent" with section 703(h). 168 The Court in Hardison additionally 
ruled that any greater than de minimis accommodation cost to the 
employer constituted undue hardship, relieving the employer of the 
accommodation obligation. 169 
While it might be inferred from the language of the Court in Hardi-
son that the existence of a valid 170 conflicting bargaining agreement 
alone constitutes undue hardship, 171 the lower courts have not inter-
preted Hardison to so hold. Where the collective bargaining agreement 
conflicts, however, and the conflicting provisions provide significant 
rights to other employees that might be infringed by accommodation, 
courts generally have excused both the union and the employer from 
accommodation on grounds of undue hardship. 172 Where no significant 
impact on the rights of other employees results, courts have required 
accommodation in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. 173 
166. Id. at 81. 
167. Id. at 81-82. 
168. Id. at 82. 
169. Id. at 84. 
170. In order to be valid, the collective bargaining agreement must not be adopted with 
discriminatory intent. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l)(c) (1988). 
171. The Court stated: "We agree that neither a collective bargaining contract nor a seniority 
system may be employed to violate the statute, but we do not believe that the duty to 
accommodate requires TWA to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise valid agreement." 
Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79 (footnote omitted). 
172. See, e.g .. Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981F.2d336, 338 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, - U.S. 
-. 61 U.S.L.W. 3834 (1993); Dickson v. International Longshoremen's Union Local 40, 38 FEP 
Cases (BNA) 1253, 1255 (D. Ore. 1985); EEOC v. Caribe Hilton Int'!, 597 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 
(D.P.R. 1984); McDonald v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 35 FEP Cases (BNA) 1661, 1665-66 
(N.D. Okla. 1984). Cf. Boomsma v. Greyhound Food Management, 639 F. Supp. 1448, 1454-55 
(W.D. Mich. 1986) (employer not required to alter facially neutral scheduling system mandated by 
collective bargaining agreement where such alteration would adversely affect other employees, 
but employer violated Title VII by disciplining employee without determining whether voluntary 
substitution was possible). 
173. See, e.g .. Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445, 452 (7th Cir. 
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The cases finding a duty to accommodate despite a conflicting contract 
have been primarily cases where the employee objects on religious 
grounds to the contractual requirement of paying union dues. 174 The 
courts have distinguished these cases from those denying accommoda-
tion, noting that where the objecting employee is required to make a 
charitable contribution, no employee is denied express contractual rights 
and all employees suffer the same economic loss.175 The courts have 
required evidence of deprivation of other employees' rights to find 
undue hardship, rejecting as insufficient generalizations about adverse 
impact on employee morale. 176 
3. ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE ADA 
If courts follow the analysis of the Rehabilitation Act cases, refusal 
to accommodate in violation of a collective bargaining agreement will 
be permissible, at least in situations that implicate contractual rights or 
expectations of other employees. Given the Congressional emphasis on 
the Rehabilitation Act's provisions, 177 one may advance a persuasive 
argument that the same result should obtain under the ADA. Congress 
clearly knew of both the statute and its judicial interpretations when it 
enacted the ADA, and expressly contemplated that the Rehabilitation 
Act would provide precedent for interpreting the "undue hardship" pro-
vision.178 The analysis of the Rehabilitation Act cases may be even 
more persuasive in interpreting the ADA because they involved not only 
a nondiscrimination obligation under Section 504, but also an affirma-
tive action obligation under Section 501, which is absent from the 
1981); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1981); Burns v. Southern 
Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). 
174. See supra cases cited at note 173. 
175. See Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d at 1243; McDaniel v. Essex Int'I, Inc., 696 
F.2d 34, 38 (6th Cir. 1982). A more cynical view would suggest that the courts are interested in 
protecting the rights of employees and employers, but not of unions. 
176. See EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(quoting Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978)) (proof of coworkers' 
unhappiness with accommodation is not undue hardship); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair 
Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. International Ass'n of 
Machinists v. Anderson, 442 U.S. 921 (1979) (general sentiment in opposition to free riders, and 
proof that other employees would grumble about accommodation that allowed employee to pay 
union dues to charity not sufficient to establish undue hardship). Cf Lambert v. Condor Mfg., 
Inc., 768 F. Supp. 600, 604 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (court denied summary judgment, finding triable 
issue of fact regarding impact on morale of employees that would result from requested 
accommodation.). 
177. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 67, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 349 
(interpreting undue hardship consistently with regulations under Sections 501 and 504); S. REP. 
No. 116, supra note 2, at 36 (same). 
178. See supra note 177. 
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ADA. 179 On the other side of the argument, however, the legislative 
history does not cite to any of the cases dealing with accommodation in 
violation of a collective bargaining agreement, and many of the refer-
ences to the Rehabilitation Act's precedential value cite only the regula-
tions, which formed the basis for mu~h of the language of the ADA but 
do not address the issue of accommodation and collective bargaining 
agreements. 180 
Cases under the religious accommodation provisions of Title VII 
further support interpreting the ADA to allow refusal to accommodate in 
violation of a collective bargaining agreement. 181 In addition, the legis-
179. See Greene, supra note 152, at 1060-62 for a description of the obligations of federal 
employers under Sections 501 and 504. Greene suggests that the affirmative action obligations 
under Section 501 support imposing upon federal employers both more stringent burdens of proof 
and a higher standard for reasonable accommodation. Id. at 1064-65, 1092, 1096-99. Cf Jeffrey 
0. Cooper, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation 
and Undue Hardship in the Americans With Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1436-41 
(1991) (arguing that reasonable accommodation requirements under Sections 501 and 504 are 
virtually identical). Cases regarding accommodation and collective bargaining agreements do not 
appear to distinguish between Sections 501 and 504. See, e.g., Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786 (1st 
Cir. 1989) (no reference to section); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987) (Section 504); 
Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984) (Sections 501and504); Bey 
v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910 (E.D .. Pa. 1982) (Sections 501 and 504), The EEOC, however, has 
distinguished between the require.~ents of Sections 5Cll and. 504, and has recently issued a 
regulation pursuant to Section 501. This new regulation requires federal employers to reassign 
disabled employees to vacant positions when they are unable to perform the essential functions of 
their jobs. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(g) (effective October l, 1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 12637 (April 
10, 1992). The EEOC rejected arguments that the regulation was inconsistent with existing case 
law which held that reassignment was not a required accommodation. The EEOC further noted 
that the case Jaw frequently involved reasonable accommodation under Section 504, but not 
Section 501, and in any event was based, in part, on EEOC regulations. See 57 Fed. Reg. 12637 
(1992). Notably, the new regulation's reassignment requirement exempts the postal service from 
reassignment when it would conflict with a collective bargaining agreement. 57 Fed. Reg. 12638 
(1992). 
180. See supra note 177; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 10, 25, 31, 32, 36; H.R. REP. No. 
485(11), supra note 17, at 23, 54, 55, 61, 63, 64-65, 67, 70, 71, 72, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
303, 304, 336, 37, 343, 345, 346-47, 349, 352, 353, 354. But see S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 
31, 62. 
181. See supra notes 163-76 and accompanying text. The union dues cases do not require a 
different conclusion since they rest on the distinction that there is no interference with the rights of 
other employees. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text. As indicated by the legislative 
history of the ADA, Congress did not intend the interpretation of undue hardship enunciated in 
TWA v. Hardison to apply to the ADA. Both the House and Senate reports suggest that the ADA 
rejects the Hardison Court's definition of undue hardship as anything more than a de minimis cost 
on the employer. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 68, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
303, 350; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 36; Legislative History of Public Law 101-336, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act, Vol. 1, at 480 (Committee Print 1990) [hereinafter "Legislative 
History"]. The portion of the holding relying on the conflicting provisions of the collective 
bargaining agreement should still be persuasive in interpreting the ADA, however, particularly 
because both the House and Senate Reports state that a collective bargaining agreement is relevant 
to the determination of the reasonableness of an accommodation. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 
supra note 17, at 63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 
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lative history of the ADA unequivocally states that an employer is not 
required to "bump" an employee from a job in order to create a vacancy 
for reassignment of a disabled individual. 182 This language suggests that 
an employee entitled to a vacancy under the seniority provisions of the 
collective bargaining agreement should not be "bumped" from the enti-
tlement in order to accommodate a disabled employee. 183 With respect 
to reassignment issues, one can argue that a disabled individual does not 
qualify for a position if he or she does not have the requisite seniority to 
obtain the position under the collective bargaining agreement. 184 
As additional support for the argument that accommodation in vio-
lation of a collective bargaining agreement is not required, "it may be a 
defense to a charge of discrimination that another Federal law or regula-
tion prohibits an action (including the provision of a particular reason-
able accommodation) that would otherwise be required by this part."185 
This section of the regulations could excuse accommodation that con-
flicts with a collective bargaining agreement, since section 301 of the 
NLRA requires compliance with such agreements. 186 
Yet support for a different interpretation of the ADA exists as well. 
Both Congress and the EEOC suggest that a conflicting collective bar-
gaining agreement is merely relevant to the determination of undue 
hardship.187 While it might be argued that this simply provides the flex-
32. Nevertheless, the statement by both houses of Congress that "[t]he Committee wishes to make 
it clear that the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in 7WA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 
(1977), are not applicable to this legislation" may be viewed as supporting a general rejection of 
Hardison. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 68, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
350; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 36. 
182. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
345; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 32. 
183. Joyce E. Margulies, Practical Considerations Regarding the Collective Bargaining 
Relationship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 49 (Practicing Law Institute, 1990). Another way of phrasing 
this argument is that a position is not vacant if another employee is entitled to the position under a 
seniority agreement. See Jules L. Smith, Accommodating the Americans with Disabilities Act to 
Collective Bargaining Obligations Under the NLRA, 18 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 273, 282 (1992). 
184. See Bales, supra note 2, at 185. Such an argument prevails only when use of seniority as 
a criterion is lawful under the disparate impact provisions of the statute. Id. at 186. 
185. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) (1992). 
186. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 450 (1957). 
The comments to both the regulation and the section of the House Report cited therein, however, 
refer to medical standards and safety requirements, a category of laws which does not apply to the 
NLRA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e), app. (1992) (citing H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 
74, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 356). Accordingly, a court may not interpret this section 
to provide a defense based on compliance with the NLRA. 
187. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text; H.R. Rep. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 
63; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 32. The statute itself enumerates certain factors to consider 
in determining undue hardship, but does not list as a factor the provisions of a collective 
bargaining agreement. ADA § 101(10)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 121 ll(lO)(B) (Supp. II 1990). 
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ibility to deny undue hardship where no other employees' rights are 
affected, the Senate Report specifically cites the seniority versus disabil-
ity conflict in job assignment as an example of a situation where the 
collective bargaining agreement "may be considered as a factor" in 
determining whether to require an accommodation. 188 Similarly, the 
EEOC suggests that it may be an undue hardship to reassign a disabled 
employee to a position to which another employee is entitled on the 
basis of the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 189 The EEOC further suggests that since the employer and the 
union have a duty to provide reasonable accommodation, they should 
work together to reach an acceptable accommodation. 190 These state-
ments by Congress and the EEOC suggest that a conflicting collective 
bargaining agreement is not a complete defense. 
The differing provisions of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA 
further support the argument that the accommodation obligation in the 
two acts differs. Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA lists reassign-
ment as a specific required accommodation. 191 Most of the Rehabilita-
tion Act cases declining to require accommodation in violation of a 
collective bargaining agreement involved reassignment. 192 The inclu-
sion of reassignment as an ADA accommodation might indicate Con-
gressional intent to require reassignment despite any agreement. 193 
While the absence of a statutory reassignment requirement under the 
Rehabilitation Act played a role in some judicial decisions denying 
accommodations in conflict with collective bargaining agreements, 194 
188. See Thomas H. Barnard, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Nightmare for Employers 
and Dream for Lawyers?, 64 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 229, 251 (1990) (citing S. REP. No. 116, IOlst 
Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1989)). The House Report suggests a similar position and further states that 
the collective bargaining agreement is not determinative. See Legislative History, supra note 181, 
at 336. 
189. See Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 35, at § 3.9, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 
405:7007. 
190. Id. 
191. See ADA § 101(9)(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(b) (Supp. II 1990). 
192. See cases cited supra notes 143-62 and accompanying text. 
193. When one statute is based on another's provisions, principles of statutory interpretation 
suggest that, where the language differs, Congress intended a different interpretation. See 
National Labor Relations Board v. United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 1195, 1199 (6th Cir. 
1987). 
194. The EEOC has revised its regulations under Section 501 and now requires reassignment 
for disabled employees under certain circumstances as a part of the federal employer's affirmative 
action obligations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(g) (1992). Interestingly, however, the EEOC 
exempted the postal service from the requirement where reassignment would conflict with any 
applicable collective bargaining agreement. Id. The EEOC reasoned that postal service 
employees, whose collective bargaining rights are governed by the National Labor Relations Act, 
have legitimate expectations based on seniority, while other federal employees, whose rights are 
governed by the Civil Service Reform Act, do not. See 51 Fed. Reg. 12638 (1992). This rationale 
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most of the decisions did not consider this a determinative factor. 195 
Indeed, several courts reached the same result where the collective bar-
gaining agreement prohibited job restructuring.196 Others suggested that 
the decision would be the same even if the statute specified reassign-
ment as ra permissible accommodation. 197 
The ADA contains an additional statutory difference: it renders 
unlawful participation in a contractual arrangement that causes discrimi-
nation.198 The ADA's legislative history confirms Congressional intent 
to bar the employer from using a collective bargaining agreement to 
avoid the discrimination prohibitions. 199 This provision does not estab-
lish Congress's intent that the accommodation obligation prevail over a 
conflicting collective bargaining agreement, however. Congress 
modeled the statutory provision after the Rehabilitation Act regula-
tions200 and, as noted, courts have uniformly construed the Rehabilita-
tion Act as not requiring accommodation in conflict with a collective 
bargaining agreement. 201 
A further argument based on the statutory distinction between the 
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA is that the Rehabilitation Act does not 
cover unions, while the ADA imposes an accommodation obligation on 
supports enforcing the legitimate expectations of private employees also governed by the NLRA 
by denying accommodations that conflict with seniority rights. 
195. See supra notes 144-59 and accompanying text. 
196. See, e.g., Jasany v. United States ·Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir. 1985); 
Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367, 1369 (10th Cir. 1984). 
197. See, e.g., Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir. 1987) ("even were there a duty to 
reassign in some cases, such a duty would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining 
agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of 
discrimination"); Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir. 1989) (favorably citing the rationale 
of the Carter court). 
198. See ADA§ 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supplement II 1990). 
199. See Smith, supra note 183, at 279 (citing Legislative History, supra note 181, at 130); 
Legislative History, supra note 181, at 336. 
200. See Legislative History, supra note 181, at 336 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.ll(c)). See also 28 
C.F.R. § 41.52(d) (1978) (revised, 1992) (Department of Justice Guidelines for federal agencies 
implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); 29 C.F.R. § 32.12(a)(3) (1980) (Department 
of Labor Regulations); 34 C.F.R. § 104.l l(a)(4) (1980) (Department of Education Regulations). 
The Department of Human Services promulgated the regulation cited by Congress. The 
Department of Justice now has responsibility for coordinating programs subject to Section 504 
and has adopted the same regulation cited above. See Greene, supra note 152, at 1061 n.27. 
201. See supra notes 143-62 and accompanying text. The force of this argument may be 
somewhat diluted by the fact that the language is not contained in the EEOC regulations 
governing federal agencies because all of the cases arose in federal agencies. See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1613.701 et seq. [superseded]. The EEOC regulations were, however, promulgated pursuant to 
Section 501, 29 U.S.C. § 791. Id. Federal employees are also covered by Section 504 
regulations, which do contain the cited language. See supra note 200. See supra note 179 for a 
discussion of the relevant Rehabilitation Act cases and the statutory sections cited therein. 
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the union as well as the employer.202 By enacting a union accommoda-
tion obligation, Congress may have intended to eliminate the virtual 
automatic invocation of conflicting collective bargaining agreements as 
undue hardship. The legislative history does not suggest that such a 
consideration, rather than a general desire to promote employment of, 
and eliminate discrimination against, individuals with disabilities, moti-
vated Congress to include labor organizations as covered entities, how-
ever. The presence of both parties to a collective bargaining agreement 
as defendants in a lawsuit under the ADA may facilitate the fashioning 
of relief that requires overriding the agreement. 203 In cases under the 
Rehabilitation Act and Title VII, however, courts have not articulated 
the absence of the union as a defendant, or in the case of the Rehabilita-
tion Act, the absence of a cause of action against the union, as a reason 
for holding that the collective bargaining agreement relieved the accom-
modation obligation. Instead, the courts focused on the expectations of 
other employees created by the agreement. These same expectations 
exist in ADA cases, raising ~e same issue, which argues for the same 
solution-a holding that the collective bargaining agreement prevails. 
The Supreme Court in Hardison cited Title VII' s exemption for 
bona fide seniority systems, Section 703(h),204 to support the conclusion 
that the seniority rights under the collective bargaining agreement 
should prevail over the requested religious accommodation. 205 The 
ADA contains no such protection for seniority systems. The absence of 
such language may suggest a Congressional intent that accommodation 
obligations prevail under the ADA.206 While Section 703(h) was cited 
as support for the Court's conclusion in Hardison,207 a close reading of 
the opinion indicates that the rights of other employees, which were cre-
ated in part by the collective bargaining agreement, were the linchpin of 
202. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text for discussion on the issue of whether the 
ADA requires unions to accommodate disabled employees. 
203. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983): There, 
the Supreme Court required the employer to comply with an arbitration award despite its claim 
that it was required to violate the contract by a conciliation agreement under Title VII. The 
employer had entered into a conciliation agreement under Title VII that conflicted with its 
obligations under the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. According to 
the Court, the employer and the EEOC could not alter the collective bargaining agreement without 
the consent of the union, which was not a party to the conciliation agreement. Id. at 770. 
204. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2(h) (1988). 
205. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977). The special 
protection for seniority systems has provided a defense in other Title VII cases as well. See 
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353 (1977) (seniority system that 
perpetuates pre-Act discrimination is not unlawful unless it had its roots in discriminatory intent). 
206. See Ervin, supra note 38, at 960-62. 
207. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81 ("Our conclusion is supported by the fact that seniority systems 
are afforded special treatment under Title VII itself."). 
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the holding. 208 Furthermore, the Rehabilitation Act cases reach the same 
result despite the absence of special statutory protection of seniority sys-
tems. 209 Thus, the omission of such statutory protection is not disposi-
tive of the issue. 
A final argument in support of according precedence to accommo-
dation rights over conflicting collective bargaining agreements is based 
on Section 501 of the ADA, which states: 
(a) ... Except as otherwise provided in this Act, nothing in this Act 
shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards 
applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 
790, et. seq.) or the regulations issued by federal agencies pursuant to 
such title. 
(b) Relationship with other laws. Nothing in this Act shall be con-
strued to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of 
any federal law or law of any state or political subdivision of any 
state or jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection for the 
208. See id.; supra notes 164-76 and accompanying text. Hardison can be distinguished in that 
it relied, in part, on the religious rights of the majority that are protected by Title VII. Hardison, 
432 U.S. at 81. The ADA does not protect the rights of the able. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)("No 
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability .... "). See Eric 
H.J. Stahlhut, Playing the Trump Card: May an Employer Refuse to Reasonably Accommodate 
under the ADA by Claiming a Collective Bargaining Obligation, 9 LAB. LAW. 71, 89 n.167 
(1993). Hardison also relied on the contractual rights of other employees, however, regardless of 
whether the employees' exercise of those rights was based on religious practices. Hardison, 432 
U.S. at 64. Furthermore, while the able are not protected by the ADA, Congress expressly 
disclaimed any intent to prefer disabled employees over equally qualified able employees. See H. 
REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 55, 56, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337, 338. A more senior 
employee entitled to a position under the collective bargaining agreement is arguably more 
qualified for the position than a disabled employee, and the employer would be entitled to accord 
the more senior employee the position as required by the agreement. As noted supra, the 
Rehabilitation Act cases find that a federal sector employer need not accommodate a disabled 
employee where such an accommodation conflicts with the provisions of a collective bargaining 
agreement, despite the fact that the statute does not protect the rights of the able and mandates 
affirmative action. See, e.g., Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (!st Cir. 1989) (Postal Service not 
required to accommodate disabled employee where reassigning him as requested would violate 
the collective bargaining rights of other employees). The Rehabilitation Act requires the Postal 
Service to engage in affirmative action for hiring, placement and advancement of disabled 
individuals. See 29 U.S.C. § 79l(b) (1988). 
The Hardison decision also may have been influenced by a concern for the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. While the religious accommodation requirement of Section 701 (j) 
has been upheld as constitutional by several courts, see, e.g., EEOC v. Ithaca Indus., Inc., 849 
F.2d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane), Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1246 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981), the Supreme Court, after Hardison, struck down as 
unconstitutional a Connecticut statute requiring employers to allow employees to refuse to work 
on their Sabbath. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985). Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence distinguished the statute from Section 70l(j) on the basis that 70l(j) 
required reasonable rather than absolute accommodation. Id. at 711. 
209. Indeed, at least one case reads§ 703(h) into the Rehabilitation Act. See Hurst v. United 
States Postal Service, 653 F. Supp. 259, 262-63 (N.D. Ga. 1986). See discussion of Hurst supra 
notes 154-56 and accompanying text. 
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rights of individuals with disabilities than afforded in this Act.210 
The argument that Congress intended this Section to preempt the NLRA 
and agreements negotiated pursuant thereto is without merit, however.211 
The ADA's statutory language and legislative history clearly indicate 
the intent to coordinate the ADA with other statutes protecting individu-
als with disabilities, insuring that the ADA does not reduce existing pro-
tections against discrimination.212 Interpreting the ADA to permit 
findings of undue hardship based on conflicts with collective bargaining 
agreements would be consistent with Section 501 since it would apply 
the standard of protection applied under the Rehabilitation Act.213 
4. PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF THE ADA 
ACCOMMODATION OBLIGATION 
The uncertainty regarding accommodation in the face of a conflict-
ing collective bargaining agreement creates difficulty for unions and 
employers deciding how to proceed in the face of accommodation 
requests. The EEOC suggests that when an employee initiates a request 
for accommodation, the employer and employee should seek a joint 
determination of the appropriate accommodation.214 Problems immedi-
ately surface for both the union and the employer, however. The NLRA 
prohibits bargaining with an individual employee about terms and condi-
tions of employment where a union represents employees.215 Thus, the 
employer is faced with conflicting obligations of two statutes. Including 
the union in the accommodation process might resolve the problem with 
individual bargaining, but the confidentiality provisions of the ADA 
may prohibit the employer from sharing with the union information 
about the employee's disability.216 Unless the employee chooses to dis-
close such information,217 a joint decision on accommodation by all 
210. ADA § 501, 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (Supp. II 1990). 
211. See Smith, supra note 183, at 280. 
212. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 1, IO!st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) at 44, reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 288-89). 
213. See supra notes 143-62 and 177-80 and accompanying text. 
214. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(3) (1992). This regulation is based on the legislative history. 
See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 65-66, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 347-48; 
S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 34. 
215. See, e.g., Allied-Signal Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 118 (1992); White-Evans Serv. Co., 285 
N.L.R.B. 81 (1987); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944). See also Wood v. 
National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987). 
216. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(c)(3)(B), 12112(c)(4)(C) (Supp. II 1990); James G. Frierson, An 
Employer's Dilemma: The ADA 's Provisions on Reasonable Accommodation and Confidentiality, 
43 LAB. L.J. 308 (1992) (discussing the problems that the confidentiality provisions create in· 
accommodating the disabled employee). For more extensive discussion of the confidentiality 
requirements see infra notes 248-67 and accompanying text. 
217. Even a suggestion by the employer to the employee that an accommodation would be 
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three parties might be impossible. 
Further, the employer would violate the NLRA if it unilaterally 
changed the collective bargaining agreement to accommodate the 
employee.218 In addition, if the accommodation required violation of the 
contract, the employer's breach would be subject to the grievance and 
arbitration procedure and ultimately to a suit for enforcement under Sec-
tion 301.219 Moreover, the confidentiality provisions of the ADA may 
directly conflict with the NLRA, which requires the employer to furnish 
to the union ·information that is relevant and necessary to the union's 
representational duties.220 Thus, compliance with the ADA may subject 
the employer to charges for violating the NLRA and vice versa. 
The union is equally on the horns of a dilemma. Under the NLRA, 
the union has no duty to bargain about or agree to any midterm modifi-
cation of a collective bargaining agreement.221 Indeed, if it does so, it is 
impossible unless information about the disability is revealed to the union might be unlawful 
under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (Supp. II 1990) ("It shall be unlawful to coerce, 
intimidate, threaten or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, . . . any right 
granted or protected by this Chapter."). The union has a duty to represent the employee as a 
member of the bargaining unit, however, and the confidentiality provisions do not prevent 
voluntary disclosure by the employee to the union. 
218. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962); Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. 1039, 
1041 (1987). While the NLRA would allow a unilateral change if the contract violated the ADA, 
it is likely that most provisions at issue in accommodation cases will be neutral provisions that 
conflict with a specific requested accommodation rather than unlawful contract provisions. See 
Standard Candy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1070, 1073 (1964) (employer did not violate the NLRA by 
unilaterally raising wage rates to comply with new minimum wages established by the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, but did violate the NLRA by unilaterally granting pay increases above the required 
minimum wage.); see also EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 364 F. Supp. 1105, 1129 (E.D. Pa. 
1973). The NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum to Field Personnel on Potential Conflicts 
Raised by Americans With Disabilities Act concludes that "it seems unlikely that an employer 
would be privileged to unilaterally change working conditions to achieve compliance with the 
ADA without giving a union any notice or opportunity to bargain." Memorandum GC-9 (August 
7, 1992), 158 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) B-15 (August 14, 1992) [hereinafter General Counsel's 
Memorandum]. 
219. See Hardin, supra note 48, at 1419. 
220. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956); NLRB v. Acme Industrial, 385 U.S. 
432, 435-36 (1967). The need for confidentiality may provide a defense for a refusal to provide 
information, but the need for the information is balanced against the need for confidentiality to 
determine whether the employer's refusal is lawful. See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 
301, 314-15 (1982); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 27, 32 (1982), enfd, 711 F.2d 
348 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 218, at D. Recently, 
the General Counsel of the NLRB issued a complaint against an employer which ceased its prior 
practice of providing the union with copies of call-in logs that indicated absences from work, 
including sick leave. See NLRB Charges Stemming from Conflicts with ADA Remain Low, Hunter 
Reports, 150 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) d15 (Aug. 6, 1993). The General Counsel rejected the 
employer's argument that the logs were protected by the confidentiality provisions of the ADA. 
Id. 
221. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). If the contract provision is unlawful under the ADA, 
however, the union may be engaged in unlawful discrimination by refusing to agree to a change. 
See NLRB General Counsel Jerry M. Hunter's Speech on Relationship Between Americans With 
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subject to challenge for breach of the duty of fair representation by 
employees who object to the change. 222 While the union will not be 
liable unless it acts arbitrarily, discriminatorily or in bad faith, 223 such a 
lawsuit is costly to defend and the standards for liability are sufficiently 
flexible to pose a risk for the union. 224 
A request for accommodation that requires waiver of a provision of 
the collective bargaining agreement raises similar issues.225 If the union 
agrees, any employee disadvantaged by the agreement may file a griev-
ance for breach of the contract. A charge for breach of duty of fair 
representation may follow if the union fails to pursue the grievance. 226 
The problem is exacerbated if the union is unable to explain its actions 
because of the ADA's confidentiality provisions.227 The union's agree-
ment to a contract breach that violates the rights of able employees with-
out sufficient information to establish that it is required by the.ADA may 
be challenged as arbitrary. 228 
While compliance with the ADA may provide a defense to a fair 
representation action, the case law suggests that the union has a duty to 
investigate and act on facts, not mere representations by the employer 
that the particular accommodation is necessary.229 For ex;nnple, under 
Disabilities Act and National Labor Relations Act Delivered at American Bar Association 
Meeting, San Francisco, Aug. JJ, 1992, 158 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D·l, D-2 (August 14, 1992) 
[hereinafter Hunter Speech] ("A party would have no right under the NLRA to insist on adherence 
to contract terms that are, on their face, violative of the ADA."). 
222. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int') v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1135 (1991). 
223. Id. at 1130. 
224. See Carter v. United Food and Commercial Workers Local 789, 963 F.2d 1078, 1082-83 
(8th Cir. 1992) (although contract fell within wide range of reasonableness, summary judgment 
for union reversed where allegations of plaintiffs regarding l) provisions of contract, 2) union's 
conduct during negotiations which failed to protect predominantly female wrapper jobs, and 3) 
biased remarks by union officials and male meat cutters evidenced discrimination against women 
in contract negotiations). 
225. An example of such a request would be a waiver of seniority to allow a less senior 
disabled employee to take a job to which another employee would be entitled under the 
agreement, or a restructuring of a job which assigned some marginal tasks to a different 
contractual job classification. 
226. A charge for breach of the duty of fair representation may result in an unfair labor 
practice within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 
N.L.R.B. 181, 186 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). The availability of 
an unfair labor practice remedy does not preclude the aggrieved employee from bringing suit in 
federal court for breach of contractual rights by the employer and breach of the duty of fair 
representation by the union. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1967). 
227. Employees without a rational explanation for the union's refusal to pursue a grievance are 
more likely to file an action for breach of the duty of fair representation. The union's reliance on 
confidentiality may be viewed by the employee as a cover-up for an unlawful motive. 
228. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190, 193 (a union breaches its duty of fair representation if its 
conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith). For a discussion of the varying standards 
applied by lower courts using the Vaca standards, see Malin, supra note 62, at 136-44. 
229. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 559, 559 n.4 (1976) (court of 
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the ADA, reassignment generally is not required unless no other accom-
modation is possible.230 To preserve any defense based on the ADA in a 
possible duty of fair representation action, the union should insure that 
no other accommodation is possible before agreeing to violate the con-
tractual rights of other employees. If the employer adheres to the confi-
dentiality provisions of the ADA, however, such a precaution may be 
impossible. The union can seek to obtain the necessary information 
through the NLRA's unfair labor practice provisions.231 The legal pro-
cedures required to do so, however, may significantly delay agreement 
to the requested accommodation, creating a further dilemma for the 
employer needing to effectuate an accommodation but reluctant to tum 
over confidential information in violation of the ADA. Furthermore, the 
union has an incentive to decline to agree to an accommodation without 
information about the disability, for it has a duty to accommodate only 
known disabilities and may escape liability under the ADA while avoid-
ing a duty of fair representation action. 232 
If the union pursues a grievance for an employee disadvantaged by 
an accommodation made to a disabled employee that violates the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the union may be charged with discrimina-
tion or retaliation under the ADA.233 In addition, the union could be 
appeals relied, inter alia, on the union's failure to investigate the grievance to find "sufficient facts 
from which bad faith or arbitrary conduct on the part of the local Union could be inferred."). The 
Supreme Court did not rule on this portion of the Court of Appeals' ruling. See also Miller v. 
Gateway Transp. Co., 616 F.2d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 1980); Tatum v. Frisco Transp. Co., 626 F.2d 
55, 59 (8th Cir. 1980); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1470, 1471 
(1978), enforced in part, 631 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1980); Beverly Manor Convalescent Ctr., 229 
N.L.R.B. 692, 696 (1977). Recent Supreme Court. cases suggest that mere negligence does not 
breach the duty of fair representation, however. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 
1127, 1135 (1991); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1990) and 
discussion of those cases in Hardin, supra note 48, at 1449-51. 
230. The comments to the EEOC regulations state that "[i]n general, reassignment should be 
considered only when accommodation within the individual's current position would pose an 
undue hardship." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0), app. (1992). In addition, reassignment is available to 
current employees only, not to applicants. Id. 
231. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
232. The disabled employee might argue that a request by the employer that the union agree to 
an accommodation in conflict with the agreement would give the union sufficient knowledge of 
the employee's limitations. 
233. A discrimination charge could be based on the union's failure to accommodate. See supra 
notes 134-37 and accompanying text. See also supra note 163. The union might also be charged 
with retaliating against the disabled individual for opposing discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12203(a) (Supp. II 1990). In addition, the union could be charged with breach of the duty of fair 
representation owed to the disabled employee. See Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 
1229, 1253 (8th Cir. 1980). The union might argue that the claim under the ADA is preempted by 
the NLRA. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 244-47 (noting that some courts have found state laws 
barring discrimination against the disabled to be preempted by the NLRA where the claims are 
dependent on an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement). Rabin suggests that the ADA is 
unclear on this issue. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner-Denver, it seems 
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accused of interfering with the disabled individual's exercise of rights 
under the Act. 234 A pattern of pursuing grievances in an effort to over-
turn accommodations might be construed as intentional discrimination 
against the disabled. 
Furthermore, the union may be politically damaged by inexplicably 
favoring one employee over others who have clear contract rights. Such 
damage may impair the union's ability to represent all of the employees 
effectively, for a divided union may lack sufficient power to negotiate a 
favorable agreement. The employer also may be adversely affected by 
the increase in both grievances and ADA claims. 
The EEOC and the NLRB are aware of the potentially conflicting 
obligations under the two statutes, but have provided little guidance.235 
The two agencies recently reached agreement on a procedure coordinat-
ing enforcement of the ADA and the NLRA, which provides for consul-
tation between the agencies when charges implicating both statutes are 
filed, but provides no substantive guidance for the employers, unions 
and employees.236 The EEOC's substantive guidance, as discussed ear-
unlikely that this argument will prevail. See infra notes 292-302 and accompanying text for 
discussion of Gardner-Denver. Rabin's suggestion that these cases should be resolved in one 
forum, arbitration, deserves serious consideration, however. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 249-363. 
Notably, even if the preemption argument succeeded, the union would still face the duty of fair 
representation claim; the employer would face a breach of contract claim. See Miller v. Publishers 
Paper Co., 131 L.R.R.M. 2578, 2581-85 (D. Or. 1986). In one of the first NLRB cases raising an 
ADA issue, a disabled employee charged that the union breached its duty of fair representation by 
refusing to support a transfer for accommodation purposes which would conflict with the 
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. See Local 876, United Food & Commercial 
Workers, 1993 W.L. 257550 (N.L.R.B. G.C. June 23, 1993). The General Counsel refused to 
issue a complaint, finding that the union's adherence to the contract was neither motivated by 
discrimination, nor was it arbitrary. Id. at 3. The General Counsel decided that the union had a 
rational basis for subordinating the interests of the disabled employee to those of other members 
of the bargaining unit who would be adversely affected by the transfer. Id. The union had agreed 
to other proposed accommodations which were rejected by the employee. Id. 
234. See ADA,§ 503(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (Supp. II 1990). 
235. See Hunter Speech, supra note 221, at D-1 through D-3; General Counsel's 
Memorandum, supra note 218, at B-15; Tension Between Disabilities Act, NLRA "Starving for 
Guidance," EEOC Counsel Says, 119 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-7 (June 19, 1992) [hereinafter 
EEOC Counsel Speech]. 
236. While early efforts by the two agencies to issue a joint memorandum of understanding 
failed, see Disabilities Act's Conflicts Cause Problems, 140 Lab. Rel. Rep. 537, 538-39 (Aug. 24, 
1992), talks between the EEOC and NLRB continued. See NLRB Charges Stemming from 
Conflicts With ADA Remain Low, Hunter Reports, 150 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) dl5 (Aug. 6, 
1993). On November 16, 1993 the EEOC and the NLRB issued a Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission. See NLRB, EEOC Memo of Understanding on Procedure for 
Coordinating ADA, NLRA, 220 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) d24 (November 17, 1993) (available on 
Westlaw). The memorandum provides for consultation and sharing of information. Id. When a 
charge is filed with the NLRB alleging an unlawful refusal to bargain and resolution of the charge 
would require interpretation of the charged party's obligations under the ADA, the NLRB General 
Counsel has agreed to consult with the EEOC's Office of Legal Counsel regarding the 
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lier, is far short of definitive.237 Similarly, the NLRB General Counsel's 
memorandum to the field personnel investigating unfair labor practice 
charges offers little help to employers and unions attempting to conform 
their conduct to the law. 238 Both agencies and the Congress have left the 
issues to be resolved through adjudication. The lack of direction leaves 
employers and unions at risk, unable to determine how to comply with 
the ADA and the NLRA. 
5. RESOLUTION OF THE ACCOMMODATION DILEMMA 
The best solution is a legislative one. Congress should directly 
address and clarify the obligations of the union and the employer when 
the only available reasonable accommodation conflicts with the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Thorough consideration and resolution of 
the union's role under the ADA would eliminate many of the uncertain-
ties and the conflicts with the NLRA. The required administrative 
processes under the ADA and the NLRA prevent disputes arising from a 
particular set of facts from consolidated resolution in one forum. There-
fore, legislative action to clarify the relationship between the two stat-
utes is particularly important beca,use of the potential for conflicting 
decisions in the same dispute. 239 Despite the desirability of Congres-
applicability of the ADA after completion of the investigation. Id. The same procedure will be 
followed when .an individual without a disability files an NLRB charge alleging that an 
accommodation to a disabled individual violated the NLRA. Id. Similarly, when the EEOC 
receives a charge alleging discrimination that would require interpretation of the charged party's 
duties under the NLRA, the EEOC will consult with the NLRB's Division of Advice regarding the 
applicability of the NLRA after completion of the investigation. Id. When a duty of fair 
representation charge is filed with the NLRB by an individual with a disability and the individual 
files a discrimination charge with the EEOC based on the same conduct, the NLRB will dismiss 
based on preliminary investigation if possible, but if not, it will defer to the EEOC investigation 
for a reasonable period. Id. If the charge is resolved by conciliation, the NLRB will dismiss, but 
if not the two agencies will consult and the NLRB will decide whether to proceed with its 
investigation or defer for a further time period. Id. If the EEOC finds no cause, the NLRB will 
resume its processing of the charge. Id. If an individual files a charge with the NLRB and none 
with the EEOC, the NLRB will notify the person of the right to file a charge with the EEOC. Id. 
If an EEOC charge is filed, the deferral process described above will be followed. Id. 
237. See supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text. 
238. See General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 218, at B-15 ("Due to the novel and 
complex issues involved, any unfair labor practice charge raising issues under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act must be referred to the Division of Advice for review."). 
239. The existence of two forums for resolution of the same or related disputes may create 
difficult issues of preclusion in litigation of the claims. For discussion of preclusion in the context 
of administration determinations, see Marjorie A. Silver, In Lieu of Preclusion: Reconciling 
Administrative Decisionmaking and Federal Civil Rights Claims, 65 IND. L.J. 367 (1990); Joel 
deJesus, lnteragency Privity and Claim Preclusion, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 195 (1990); Rex R. 
Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral· Estoppel: Limiting Preclusive Effect of Administrative 
Determinations in Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 422 (1983). 
Professor Rabin's argument for arbitrating cases involving disability claims and contract 
rights attempts to address, in part, the multiple forum problem. See infra note 314. The use of 
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sional action, however, reconsideration of the ADA in the near future 
appears unlikely. Thus employers, unions, employees, and the courts 
and agencies involved must consider other solutions. The recommenda-
tions below are directed to these parties, but legislative adoption of the 
recommendations remains the best alternative. 
a. The Exculpatory Clause 
Congress has suggested that the employer and the union negotiate a 
clause in the contract authorizing the employer to take all actions neces-
sary to comply with the ADA.240 The EEOC Technical Assistance Man-
ual reiterates this suggestion.241 Agreement to such a provision requires 
the union to cede to the employer the authority to act unilaterally in 
many areas. Many unions may be unwilling to surrender the right to 
bargain about accommodations that might require abrogation of the 
agreement. Cessation of the right to bargain over accommodations 
would permit the employer to choose the accommodation that violated 
the agreement, rather than another accommodation that might be equally 
effective. Such freedom could be an effective tool for the employer 
desirous of undermining the union and destroying bargaining unit soli-
darity. Other employers, in good faith, are likely to choose the least 
expensive accommodation, regardless of its impact on other employees' 
collectively bargained rights. Moreover, because of the confidentiality 
requirements, the union might be unable to verify that an employer 
action is taken to comply with the statute, thereby increasing the union's 
reluctance to agree to such a provision. 242 · 
Furthermore, removing the union from the process of determining 
appropriate accommodations243 might limit the range of possible accom-
arbitration would not necessarily encompass any claims under the NLRA that arose out of the 
dispute, however. The NLRB has a policy of deferring to the arbitration procedure cases where 
the unfair labor practice claim overlaps with a contractual claim subject to arbitration. See Hardin, 
supra note 48, at 1012-82. If a case met the NLRB's standards for deferral, then it might be 
resolved in the arbitration process as well. See id. for discussion of the standards for deferral. 
240. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345; 
S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 32. 
241. See Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 35, at §§ 3.9, 7.Jl(a), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. 
(BNA) 405:7007, 405:7050. 
242. Union agreement to such a provision could eliminate the argument that the union is 
entitled to information about the disability in order to comply with the statute's requirements. See 
infra notes 248-67 and accompanying text for an argument regarding union entitlement to 
information despite the confidentiality provisions. 
243. As noted supra notes 215 and 218 and accompanying text, the NLRA requires the 
employer to bargain with the union over any changes in terms and conditions of employment. If 
the union has clearly and unequivocally waived the right to bargain, however, the employer can 
make changes unilaterally. See Rockwell Int'l Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. 1346, 1347 (1982). The 
suggested contract provision appears to be a broad waiver of the right to bargain over 
accommodations to the disabled. 
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modations considered and impede acceptance of the chosen accommo-
dation by able members of the bargaining unit. Where the union 
participates in the process of finding.the appropriate accommodation, it 
has a greater chance of convincing any disgruntled members of the bar-
gaining unit of the need for the accommodation. 
A union unconcerned about agreement to such a provision, or will-
ing to agree to it in exchange for certain concessions,244 may still con-
front grievances from members of the bargaining unit disadvantaged by 
particular accommodations. 245 The union must be prepared to respond 
to such grievances, perhaps uninformed of the reason for the employer's 
action. Duty of fair representation charges and political problems may 
be generated. On the other hand, where such a clause is contained in the 
agreement, the union can avoid liability for any discriminatory action by 
the employer taken pursuant to the agreement. 246 The union would risk 
liability only for intentionally discriminatory actions by the union.247 
b. The Confidentiality Issue 
If no exculpatory clause is negotiated, the employer and union must 
deal with the impact of the confidentiality provisions.248 The confidenti-
ality requirements present obstacles to negotiation of any accommoda-
tion by the union, the employer, and the disabled employee. They 
hinder the union's ability to comply with the ADA and fairly represent 
all employees as required by the NLRA. Additionally, the requirements 
impose an obligation on the employer that may conflict with the obliga-
tion under the NLRA to provide the union with information relevant to 
its bargaining duties. 249 This conflict could be minimized by a change 
in the regulations allowing the employer to disclose to the union, and to 
244. Courts should not find failure to agree to such a provision to be unlawful discrimination 
or even evidence of unlawful discrimination. See supra notes 101-15 and accompanying text. 
The union should not be required to sacrifice its representation rights or the collectively bargained 
rights of the employees that it represents to avoid liability for discrimination. Such a finding 
would negate the rights Congress provided in the NLRA. 
245. Such grievances could come from able employees adversely affected by an 
accommodation or from disabled employees alleging discriminatory treatment. 
246. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
247. For example, if the employer refused to accommodate the employee, and the union 
refused to process a grievance over that failure because of the employee's disability, then liability 
should attach. 
248. While the existence of some disabilities is obvious, a disability requiring use of a 
wheelchair, for example, other disabilities may not be apparent. See Frierson, supra note 216, at 
310. Frierson highlights a number of the potential problems with the confidentiality provisions. 
As Frierson notes, insuring that disabled individuals maintain as much privacy as they desire 
about their disability is a laudable goal. Id. at 310. For individuals with AIDS, where widespread 
fear and discrimination are a reality, nondisclosure may be essential. See Ron Stodghill, II, 
Managing AIDS, Bus. WK., February l, 1993, at 48. 
249. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
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employees affected by any accommodation, sufficient information to 
insure both effective negotiation and appropriate accommodation. 
In most cases, disclosure to the union will be advantageous to the 
disabled employee. The union, which has a duty to represent the dis-
abled employee, can most effectively accomplish that representation if it 
is aware of the specific nature of the disability. Furthermore, if the 
union talces action adverse to the disabled individual, establishing dis-
crimination will be extraordinarily difficult if the individual cannot 
prove the union's knowledge of the disability. In addition, disclosure is 
required in order to trigger the union's accommodation obligation under 
the statute, for a covered entity must accommodate only "known physi-
cal or mental limitations".25° For these reasons, the employee may 
choose to disclose the disability to the union. 
In the absence of voluntary disclosure, the statute specifically 
authorizes the covered entity to disclose medical information only to 
supervisors and managers, first aid and safety personnel, and govern-
ment officials investigating compliance with the ADA.251 The EEOC 
regulation additionally authorizes release of information to state work-
ers' compensation offices or second injury funds. 252 The comments 
emphasize that such disclosure serves purposes that do not conflict with 
the ADA.253 Similarly, disclosure to union officials in order to enable 
negotiation of reasonable accommodations does not conflict with the 
ADA, but furthers its purposes. Allowing disclosure would enable the 
employer and the union to comply with both the NLRA and the ADA.254 
Complete disclosure of all aspects of an employee's disability gen-
erally will be unnecessary. Like supervisors and managers, the union 
250. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). 
251. See ADA §§ 102(c)(3)(B), 102(c)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(c)(3)(B), 12112(c)(4)(C) 
(Supp. II 1990). 
252. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b), app. (1992). 
253. Id. 
254. Authorization of disclosure does not resolve all of the potential conflicts, but would assist 
in reconciling the two statutes. In discussing the statutory conflicts, the NLRB General Counsel 
cites a provision in the EEOC regulations stating "it may be a defense to a charge of 
discrimination that another Federal law or regulation prohibits an action (including the provision 
of a particular reasonable accommodation) that would otherwise be required by this part." See 
Hunter Speech, supra note 221, at D-2 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e)). That section could be 
interpreted both to excuse accommodation which conflicts with a collective bargaining agreement, 
because Section 301 of the NLRA has been interpreted to require compliance with such 
agreements, and to allow disclosure when required by the NLRA. In addition, an employer or 
union could argue, as a defense to a discrimination action based on a contract provision that is not 
clearly unlawful, that unilateral change in the collective bargaining agreement is prohibited by the 
NLRA. Because both the comments to the regulation and the section of the House Report cited 
therein refer to medical standards and safety requirements, this section may not be interpreted to 
provide a defense based on compliance with the NLRA. See supra notes 185-86 and 
accompanying text. 
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needs to know only the limitations that affect the employee's job, not the 
cause of the disability. 255 For example, it should be sufficient that the 
union knows that the employee has a disability that requires frequent 
rest breaks, not whether the disability results from AIDS, cancer, arthri-
tis or some other cause. Before a duty to accommodate attaches, how-
ever, the union is entitled to verification that the employee is a qualified 
individual with a disability in need of accommodation.256 Limited dis-
closure will provide some protection for employees with the legitimate 
concern that disclosure of a disability would cause stigma and 
discrimination. 
Authorization of limited disclosure257 to employees affected by any 
accommodation also would resolve some of the statutory problems. 
Employees aware of the need for accommodation will be less likely to 
grieve any contract violation resulting from the accommodation, and less 
likely to charge the union with a failure of the fair representation 
duty. 258 Indeed, an employee might volunteer to change shifts, 
exchange job duties, or take other accommodating action if he or she is 
aware that the action is necessary to allow a disabled colleague to 
remain employed. 259 At a minimum, when the union declines to process 
the grievance, it should be able to disclose to the able employee the basis 
for its decision. This would avoid unnecessary litigation. 
The EEOC should amend the regulation to permit the same disclo-
sure to unions and to affected employees that is authorized for supervi-
sors and managers. While the regulation might be challenged as 
contrary to the statute, which lists specific exceptions to the disclosure 
prohibition, the regulation should be upheld as consistent with the statu-
tory purpose and necessary to enable the union's compliance with its 
duty of reasonable accommodation.260 
2SS. The statute and regulations provide that "supervisors and managers may be informed 
regarding necessary restrictions on the work or duties of the employee and necessary 
accommodations." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(c)(3)(B)(i), 12112(c)(4)(C) (Supp. II 1990); 29 C.F.R. 
§§ 1630.14 (c)(l)(i), 1630.14(d)(l)(i) (1992). 
2S6. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (app.) (1992). 
257. Employees need only know that the actions taken by the employer with respect to the 
disabled employee constitute an accommodation under the ADA which has been discussed with 
and agreed to by the union. 
258. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 28-29 (citing Wolfe, Disability is No Hardship for 
du Pont (study showed that "[f]ellow employees did not resent necessary accommodations made 
for employees with disabilities")). 
2S9. See, e.g., Chris Fiscus, American Expresses Its Support, Arizona Business Gazette, July S, 
1991at13 (American Express has more employees than necessary who have volunteered to assist 
disabled employees); Expansion of Government Leave Programs Urged, 143 Lab. Rel. Rep. 
(BNA) !SS (May 31, 1993) (federal government pilot programs that allow employees to donate 
their annual leave time to others with health problems requiring extended absence have worked 
well). 
260. See National Confectioners Ass'n v. Califano, S69 F.2d 690, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
1994) ADA AND UNIONS 613 
. Even absent amendment, the courts should interpret the statute to 
allow the disclosure required to make an effective accommodation.261 If 
the employer262 discloses only information necessary to effectuate an 
accommodation, a court should find no breach of the confidentiality 
requirements.263 Alternatively, if the employee refuses to authorize the 
employer to disclose to the union or affected employees the information 
necessary to negotiate and implement an accommodation, then the 
eqiployer should prevail in a complaint for failure to accommodate. 264 It 
would b.e an undue hardship for the employer to violate the NLRA in 
order to accommodate the employee. The employer would be unable to 
bargain with the union about the accommodation without at least limited 
disclosure.265 In order to succeed with this defense, however, the 
employer should be required to show both that it attempted to obtain the 
employee's agreement to disclosure and that no accommodation that did 
not require disclosure was available.266 
The confidentiality provisions of the statute would be further lim-
ited if interpreted to apply only to information obtained in the course of 
a medical examination. Such an interpretation comports with the statu-
261. See Frierson, supra note 216, at 311. 
262. The same rule should apply to the union if it discloses information to employees affected 
by an accommodation. 
263. Information necessary to effectuate an accommodation would include telling employees 
who will be affected by an accommodation that the action is taken to accommodate a disabled 
employee. Such disclosure is necessary to prevent morale problems, grievances, and duty of fair 
representation complaints. 
264. The employer should prevail only with respect to the particular accommodation, however. 
If any other reasonable accommodation is available that could be implemented without disclosure 
and undue hardship, the employer would be required to make such an accommodation. As the 
NLRB General Counsel suggests, "putting a desk on blocks, providing a ramp [or] adding braille 
signage" probably would not be changes in terms and conditions of employment that would 
require bargaining with the union. Hunter Speech, supra note 221, at D-1. Nor should such 
changes adversely affect other employees. 
265. As noted earlier, the employer would violate the NLRA by not bargaining with the union 
about the accommodation, by unilaterally modifying the collective bargaining agreement, and by 
refusing to give the union relevant information about the accommodation. See supra notes 215-20 
and accompanying text. 
266. See Frierson, supra note 216, at 311; supra note 264. Encouraging the employer to 
request authorization from the employee creates a risk that the employer will coerce employees to 
reveal confidential information under threat· of termination for inability to accommodate. Id. In 
fact, however, the statute creates the problem because knowledge is required to trigger the 
accommodation and nondiscrimination obligations. In situations where the only available 
accommodation requires agreement of, or accommodation by, the union, the employee must 
choose to disclose or forego the accommodation. As noted earlier, however, disclosure can be 
limited to what is necessary to trigger the accommodation obliga~ion and effectuate the 
accommodation. Efforts to coerce unnecessary disclosure or to avoid accommodation by failing 
to explain to the employee the need for disclosure and the limited nature of the disclosure would 
constitute unlawful discrimination. 
614 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:567 
tory language. 267 If the employer or the union obtained information 
about the employee's disability from other sources, the confidentiality 
requirements would not apply. If the employer initially learned about 
the disability from the examination, however, and in following up on the 
examination received additional information from the employee or other 
sources, there is a persuasive argument that all of the information should 
be protected as confidential. Absent the examination, the employer 
would not have had the medical data. This interpretation of the statute 
might allow the employer to reveal some data about the disability to the 
union or other employees for accommodation purposes without risk of 
violating the ADA. 
Interpreting the ADA to allow the disclosure necessary to effectuate 
accommodations relieves some of the problems posed by the duty to 
accommodate in the unionized workplace. Most importantly, it allows 
the employer, the union, and the disabled employee to jointly achieve an 
appropriate accommodation that accomplishes the goals of the ADA 
while protecting the rights of other employees. A significant remaining 
issue, however, is whether accommodation is required when it conflicts 
with a provision of the existing collective bargaining agreement. 
c. Conflicts Between Accommodations and the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement 
Although several commentators have argued that the duty of 
accommodation should outweigh a conflicting provision of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement,268 few have considered thoroughly the 
problems faced by the employer and the union when confronted by the 
dual obligations, particularly conflicts with the NLRA.269 While signifi-
cant weight should be given to the need for accommodation in light of 
267. The statute states that "[a] covered entity may require a medical examination ... if ... 
information obtained regarding the medical condition or history of the applicant is collected and 
maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and is treated as a confidential medical 
record .... " ADA § 102(c)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(3) (Supp. II 1990). The provisions for 
medical examinations of employees are subject to the same conditions. See ADA§ 102(c)(4)(C); 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(4)(C) (Supp. II 1990). 
268. See Bales, supra note 2, at 203; Renee L. Cyr, Note, The Americans With Disabilities Act: 
Implications for Job Reassignment and the Treatment of Hypersusceptible Employees, 51 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1237, 1257-59; Barbara Kamenir Frankel, The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 on Collective Bargaining Agreements, 22 Sw. U. L. REv. 257, 283-84 (1992). Cf. 
Stahlhut, supra note 208, at 93-95 (advocating a balancing of rights); Ervin, supra note 38, at 971-
72 (urging a balancing, but arguing for greater weight on the disabled employee's right to 
accommodation); David S. Doty, The Impact of Federal Labor Policy on the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1055, 1088-89 (1992) (suggesting that 
reassignment in violation of the collective bargaining agreement should be considered); Smith, 
supra note 183, at 282-83 (arguing that the collective bargaining agreement should prevail). 
269. See supra notes 214-34 and accompanying text. 
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the purposes of the ADA, the NLRA and collective bargaining agree-
ments negotiated thereunder must also weigh in the balance. The legis-
lative history of the ADA and the language of the EEOC regulations 
suggest that Congress did not contemplate that a conflict with the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, without more, constitutes undue hardship. 
The concern raised throughout the legislative history, the regulations, 
and the cases under the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII is the impact of 
accommodation on the collectively bargained rights of other employees. 
While every accommodation that conflicts with the contract vio-
lates the rights of employees protected by the agreement in a broad 
sense, many accommodations will not infringe directly on any 
employee's contractually based expectations. For example, allowing a 
supervisor to perform some marginal tasks within the disabled 
employee's job description may violate a contractual ban on supervisors 
engaging in bargaining unit work. The contract provision furnishes 
important protection for employees against erosion of bargaining unit 
jobs. A limited waiver of the provision to allow accommodation of a 
disabled employee, however, does not significantly threaten the bargain-
ing unit, nor does it infringe on any employee's expectations about his 
or her own job, or a job to which the employee is entitled under the 
seniority provisions of the agreement. Similarly, a contractual provision 
for two fifteen-minute breaks and one thirty minute lunch period each 
day gives important rights to unit employees. Allowing a disabled 
employee more breaks may violate the agreement, but does not interfere 
with any employee's right to the rest periods guaranteed by the 
agreement. 
While the employer should be required to bargain with the union 
about these accommodations, the conflict between the accommodation 
and the agreement should not constitute an undue hardship excusing 
such an accommodation. Thus, an employer or union's refusal to agree 
to such an accommodation would be an unlawful failure to accommo-
date absent unusual circumstances.270 Additionally, failure to process a 
270. If the employer's action was part of a pattern of eroding the bargaining unit by using 
supervisors to perform bargaining unit work, for example, then the union's opposition to such an 
accommodation would not be unlawful. See Eastern Slope Rural Tel. Ass'n, 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
(BNA) 986 (1983) (Maclean, Arb.) and Bell Tel. Co., 75 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 750 (1980) 
(Garrett, Arb.) for examples of arbitration cases involving use of nonmembers of the bargaining 
unit to do bargaining unit work. 
Where one party refuses to agree to such an accommodation, the employee can file a charge 
for failure to accommodate with the EEOC. See ADA,§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. II 
1990) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 706(b) (1988)). Only the objecting party should be found liable. 
Any other rule would penalize the union when it was willing to agree and had no way to 
implement the accommodation on its own. In addition, the employer willing to accommodate 
would be forced to choose between risking liability under the ADA or implementing the 
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grievance challenging the accommodation would not violate the duty of 
fair representation. In order to reconcile the ADA with the NLRA, 
which privileges refusal to negotiate about or agree to modifications of a 
collective bargaining agreement during its term, the rule would not 
apply where a reasonable accommodation was available that did not 
conflict with the collective bargaining agreement.271 Thus, neither the 
employer nor the union would violate the ADA by refusing to agree to 
an accommodation that violated the agreement unless no other effective 
accommodation was possible. 
On the other hand, an accommodation that would restructure an 
able employee's job, force an able employee to change shifts, or deny an 
able employee a job to which he or she would be entitled under the 
agreement significantly impacts the able employee's contractual 
rights.272 While the employer, the union, and the disabled employee, 
accommodation over the objection of the union and risking an unfair labor practice charge for 
unilateral change or a grievance for violating the agreement. While it is unlikely that the NLRB 
would find that the type of accommodations encompassed by this rule would rise to the level of an 
unlawful unilateral change, the employer should not be forced assume such a risk. 
271. Section 8( d) of the NLRA provides that neither party is required to discuss or agree to any 
modification of the contract which is to become effective before the contract allows those terms 
and conditions to be reopened. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). The ADA's duty to accommodate 
seems to require the parties to discuss any variation in the contract terms that might be an 
appropriate accommodation, however, at least if no other accommodation is available. See 
Stephen M. Crow & Sandra J. Hartman, ADA Versus NLRA: Is a Showdown Imminent Over 
Reasonable Accommodation?, 44 Lab. L.J. 375, 378 (1993). The rule proposed here would 
require agreement, not to contract modification, but to a waiver of the contractual requirements for 
purposes of accommodation under limited circumstances. The bargaining requirement may be 
justified, although it requires discussion of waiver of existing contract terms, because disability 
discrimination is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See Hardin, supra note 48, at 901-02 n.302. 
272. Bales suggests that since reassignment is considered only when no other reasonable 
accommodation is available, the disabled employee seeking reassignment should be 
accommodated regardless of the agreement because the alternative is discharge. See Bales, supra 
note 2, at 203. While accommodation ensuring immediate continued employment is preferable, 
where unavailable because of another employee's entitlement to the job, the employee with a 
disability could be placed on medical leave for the time necessary to obtain another position for 
which he or she is qualified. If the agreement limits medical leave, extension of the leave would 
be a violation of the agreement that would not adversely affect the rights of other employees. This 
is not a perfect solution if the leave is unpaid, but it provides an alternative that ensures continuing 
employment. 
It should also be noted that these accommodations will not inevitably conflict with the 
collective bargaining agreement. A particular agreement might give the employer the right to 
change job duties unilaterally. Under other circumstances, the disabled employee might have 
sufficient seniority to obtain a favorable shift or job. 
Courts adjudicating both Title VII and constitutional discrimination claims have a history of 
protecting the legitimate expectations of existing employees. See International Bhd. of Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 
(1977); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986). Where necessary to provide a 
remedy to identified victims of discrimination, however, courts have tolerated some interference 
with such expectations, particularly when the expectations were created in part by the 
discrimination. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Sys., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (discriminatees entitled 
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might voluntarily agree to effectuate such an accommodation, the con-
flict with the able employee's rights under the agreement would consti-
tute undue hardship excusing the accommodation. This test provides a 
clear guide for the employer and the union as to when accommodation is 
required, while encouraging the parties to negotiate an accommodation 
satisfactory to all.273 
In certain types of accommodation cases, the employer and the 
union that fail to accommodate in violation of the agreement might 
invoke a second defense. If the employee requests reassignment to, or 
an applicant assignment to, a job that is not available under the agree-
ment because of the disabled employee's lack of seniority or lack of 
experience in other jobs, then the employee is not a qualified individual 
with a disability under the statute.274 In order to prevail in such a case, 
the disabled employee or applicant must show that the qualification 
requirements that bar the individual are unlawful because they were 
adopted or applied with discriminatory intent275 or they have an unjusti-
fied discriminatory impact. 276 
Some may criticize this solution as insufficiently protecting dis-
abled employees. The solution may, in fact, prevent accommodation of 
some disabled employees. 277 Predictions of substantial adverse effects 
for disabled employees, however, presume union insensitivity to the 
to award of seniority retroactive to the date on which the discriminatory refusal to hire occurred); 
Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (bumping innocent employee permissible to 
remedy Title VII violation). But cf. Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(bumping of innocent employee not permissible). It is clear that the ADA does not require 
bumping in order to accommodate. See ADA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. II 1990). 
273. Both Stahlhut and Ervin propose case by case balancing approaches that take into account 
·the interests of the disabled employee and those of other employees who would be affected by an 
accommodation. See Stahlhut, supra note 208, at 93-5; Ervin, supra note 38, at 970-71. The ad 
hoc balancing approaches are appealing for their flexibility, but they provide far less guidance for 
the parties than the test advocated here and will create more litigation. The union and the 
employer remain free to balance the interests in each case and make an accommodation 
agreement, however. 
274. The definition of the term "qualified individual with a disability" could be clarified in the 
EEOC regulations to include satisfaction of the seniority requirements for the position. Currently, 
the regulations define the term as "an individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, 
experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such 
individual holds or desires." See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1992). While the regulation as written 
would cover job-related seniority requirements, specific inclusion of seniority, along with skill, 
experience and education would clarify the issue. 
275. See ADA, § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 1990). 
276. See ADA §§ 102(b)(3), (6), (7), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(3), (6), (7) (Supp. II 1990). 
277. Interestingly, however, while the accommodation duty has been called the centerpiece of 
the law, only 20% of the ADA cases filed with the EEOC in 1992 alleged failure to accommodate. 
Statement by Christopher Bell, Acting Associate Legal Counsel, Americans with Disabilities Act 
Services, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, at ALI-ABA Video Law Review, 
Americans with Disabilities Act (December 10, 1992). 
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needs of disabled employees. While the passage of the ADA and the 
evidence presented in support of its enactment demonstrate widespread 
discrimination against disabled individuals, the legislative history 
reflects no testimony regarding union discrimination. Indeed, unions 
actively supported passage of the statute.278 Even before passage of the 
ADA many unions negotiated contractual protections for disabled 
employees.279 Furthermore, seniority requirements for reassignment, the 
most frequently cited area of potential conflict, will not bar many dis-
abled employees because older, longer service employees are more 
likely to be disabled than younger employees.280 
278. See Sam F. Parigi et al., Labor Law and the Future of Organized Labor under the Clinton 
Administration, 44 LAB. L.J. 313, 313 (1993); Letter from Gerald W. McEntee, International 
President, AFSCME, to Frances M. Hart, Executive Officer, EEOC 1 (April 29, 1991) (on file 
with EEOC in Comments on the EEOC Proposed Regulations on Title I of the ADA); George J. 
Kourpias, Comments of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers on 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act 3 (April 29, 1991) (on file with the EEOC); Unions Are Not in 
Conflict with ADA, Conference Attendees Told, 92 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at d7 (May 14, 1993) 
(unions have traditionally worked for the employment rights of employees with disabilities); 
Unions Said Likely to Have to Bow to ADA in Conflicts Over Seniority, 63 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
at A-8 (April 5, 1993) (unions are part of the solution to disability discrimination); Union 
Contract Provisions May Conflict With Federal Disability Act Obligations, 13 Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) at A-5 (January 21, 1992) (labor movement was one of the groups lobbying for disability 
rights act). 
279. See Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 922-23 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (collective bargaining 
agreement provides for reassignment to light duty status for ill or injured full-time regular or part-
time flexible employee with 5 years of service, or any such employee injured on the job regardless 
of years of service); Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 27 M.S.P.R. 426, 428 (1985) 
(collective bargaining agreement requires Postal Service to reassign to light duty employees 
disabled by injury at work); see also Waterous Co., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 278, 280, 281, 284 
(1993) (Reynolds, Arb.) (under contract in effect prior to effective date of ADA, arbitrator ordered 
employer to assign employee disabled by occupational injury to light duty work); Iowa Elec. Light 
& Power Co., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 393, 399 (1993) (Pelofsky, Arb.) (contract prohibits 
disability discrimination and arbitrator held that learning disabled employee was unjustly 
discharged for failing to pass hazardous materials test because company did not determine the 
nature of the disability and tailor instruction to the disability); Madison Adult Education Dist., 100 
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 450, 455-56 (1993) (Johnson, Arb.) (employer violated disability 
discrimination clause of collective bargaining agreement by failing to reasonably accommodate 
disabled employee with a transfer to a vacant position); USS-Minnesota Ore Operations, 100 Lab. 
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 791, 794 (1993) (agreement contained provisions authorizing the company and 
union to disregard seniority rights in the job placement of disabled employees by mutual 
agreement). The first two cases involved postal service unions. The latter four cases involved 
locals of the International Association of Machinists, the International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, the American Federation of Teachers, and the United Steelworkers respectively. 
For a discussion of the potential of unions in resolving discrimination issues for employees, 
see Stephen A. Plass, Arbitrating, Waiving and Deferring Title VII Claims, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 
779, 827-28 (1992). 
280. A common scenario raising the issue of accommodation is placement of employees 
returning from medical leaves or absences due to work-related injuries. See Jane B. Stranch, 
Rights and Duties of Organized Labor Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, at 17 
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (majority of EEOC claims in the Tennessee area 
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Educational efforts can further aid in accommodation. Many 
national unions have developed educational materials regarding employ-
ees with disabilities.281 All employees risk becoming disabled at some 
point in their working lives, whether through disease or injury. Aware-
ness of this significant possibility will help to convince employees to 
support both contractual protections and reasonable accommodations for 
disabled employees. 282 As a result, unions will be better able to repre-
sent the disabled members of the bargaining unit and equalize their 
rights with those of able employees. 283 
A determination, whether legislative or judicial, that an accommo-
dation adversely affecting the collectively bargained rights of other 
employees creates undue hardship might discourage unions and employ-
ers from voluntarily negotiating such an accommodation. The union, 
however, owes a duty of fair representation to both disabled and able 
employees and therefore must determine, in good faith and based on the 
merits of the issues involved, whether to seek or agree to 
accommodation. 284 
Ideally, the parties should obtain the agreement of any affected 
employees to the accommodation. This would both obviate morale 
problems and eliminate grievances and duty of fair representation com-
plaints. Absent agreement by .the affected employee(s), the union and 
the employer should still be permitted to agree to an accommodation. 
The employer would be protected from a breach of contract claim by the 
are coming from employees who are or have been disabled, not from applicants). Anecdotal 
evidence from practicing attorneys available to the author suggests that the Tennessee experience 
is not atypical. Those most likely to be affected adversely by seniority requirements are disabled 
applicants seeking jobs for which the employer does not hire at the entry level. Since applicants 
have no right to reassignment, those individuals would not have a claim unless the employer's 
requirements for the non-entry level jobs were found to be discriminatory, either intentionally or 
by virtue of an unjustified disparate impact. 
281. See Frierson, supra note 216, at 311. 
282. Many unions have already negotiated such protections. For example, '(6(a) of the UAW-
General Motors National Agreement states: 
It is the policy. of General Motors arid the UAW that the provisions of this 
Agreement be applied to all employes covered by this Agreement without 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, age, sex, national origin or handicap. 
Any claims of violation of this policy or claims of sexual harassment may be taken 
up as a grievance .... 
See supra note 279 for other examples of union-negotiated protections for disabled employees. 
283. See Smith, supra note 183, at 283. 
284. See id. at 280. Ervin suggests a number of factors that should be considered in making 
the decision. See Ervin, supra note 38, at 969. The recent decision of the NLRB General Counsel 
in Local 876, United Food and Commercial Workers, 1993 W.L. 257550 (N.L.R.B. G.C. June 23, 
1993) recognizes that a union that decides in good faith and without discriminatory motive not to 
agree to an accommodation in violation of the collective bargaining agreement does not breach its 
duty of fair representation. See supra note 233. 
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union's agreement.285 The union might be vulnerable to a duty of fair 
representation claim from any employee adversely affected by the 
accommodation, however. The NLRB or the courts faced with such a 
claim should find for the union unless hostility or discrimination against 
the able employee motivated the union's action.286 A decision to 
accommodate in violation of the agreement may not be arbitrary. Simi-
larly a decision to rely on the doctrine of undue hardship should protect 
both the employer and the union unless the disabled employee could 
demonstrate that intentional discrimination motivated the decision.287 
The suggested interpretation of the statute may also be criticized as 
insufficiently protecting free collective bargaining. Effectively, the pro-
posed solution requires violation of the negotiated agreement in certain 
circ;umstances. The interference with the agreement is limited in scope, 
however. Viewed as a whole, this proposal sustains the collective bar-
gaining system by insuring an important role for the union in negotiating 
accommodations for disabled employees. 
The proposed standards would be most effectively implemented by 
legislative or regulatory action, providing clear guidance to the parties. 
Absent clarifying legislation or rulemaking, the courts and the NLRB 
should interpret the ADA and the NLRA as set forth above. The inter-
pretation is consistent with the statutory language and legislative history 
of the ADA and resolves many of the conflicts created by the accommo-
dation obligation while protecting the rights of both employees with dis-
abilities and employees without disabilities. A clearly defined standard 
will limit the potential floodgate of litigation over these issues under 
both the AD A and the NLRA, thereby reducing the burdens on the 
285. The employer might lose the protection if the union were found to have violated the duty 
of fair representation, however. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 569 
(1976) (where union has breached its duty of fair representation, contractual remedy against the 
employer is not foreclosed by failure to exhaust grievance procedure or final and binding 
arbitration award). 
286. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 193 (1967) (union breaches the duty of fair 
representation if its conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith). 
287. The fact that the union and the employer negotiate in an attempt to reach agreement on an 
accommodation that would violate the agreement should not waive their right to assert the undue 
hardship defense if no agreement is reached. Such an interpretation would discourage efforts to 
negotiate accommodations, thereby interfering with the goals of the statute. Should the union and 
employer disagree, one party willing to accommodate in violation of the agreement and the other 
unwilling, both should be protected against any claim of discrimination by the undue hardship 
defense. The union, however, might be able to file a grievance under the collective bargaining 
agreement if the agreement contains contractual rights for the disabled employee. The arbitrator 
would have to determine whether the agreement's protection against disability discrimination 
required accommodation. The employer's only recourse, if it desires to accommodate in violation 
of the agreement, would be to act unilaterally and risk a grievance or unfair labor practice charge. 
The employer should not be privileged to act unilaterally by virtue of the union's failure to agree 
to a violation of the agreement that would adversely affect another employee. 
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administrative agencies and the courts.288 In addition, the standard best 
accommodates the policies of both statutes, prohibiting discrimination 
against employees with disabilities while preserving the collective bar-
gaining system established by the NLRA. 
G. The ADA and Grievance Arbitration 
Almost all collective bargaining agreements contain a grievance 
procedure that culminates in binding arbitration.289 Typically, the arbi-
tration procedure encompasses disputes regarding the meaning and 
application of the agreement. 290 Many contracts contain provisions 
relating to disability; arbitrating disputes involving disability issues is 
not uncommon.291 The potential for ADA liability may encourage 
unions to negotiate additional protections for employees with disabilities 
and to arbitrate more grievances over violations of these contractual pro-
visions. 292 The ADA expressly encourages the use of alternative dispute 
resolution, including arbitration, to resolve disputes under the statute.293 
The contractual grievance and arbitration procedure can· provide an 
effective means of resolving disability issues. This avoids the necessity 
of a lengthy and expensive federal court action.294 
If the union arbitrates or seeks to arbitrate an issue that is also cov-
ered by the ADA and the employee files suit under the statute, the court 
must determine · how the arbitration decision will effect the statutory 
claim. Precedent under Title VII suggests that the employee is entitled 
to pursue the judicial action regardless of the outcome of the arbitration 
or the existence of an arbitral remedy.295 In Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
288. The proposals for interpretation of the statute suggested here are designed to work as a 
comprehensive scheme. If all of the decisionmaking bodies involved do not adopt the suggested 
interpretations, the goal of minimizing litigation will not be achieved and conflicting decisions 
will persist. In addition, the NLRB and the EEOC should continue to work together in an effort to 
come to agreement about treatment of these issues. The recent memorandum of understanding is 
a step in the right direction. See supra note 236. The NLRB should also consider refusing to 
defer to arbitration cases involving ADA issues that would otherwise be deferred until the law in 
this area is established by the agencies and courts. See discussion of the NLRB's deferral policy 
in Hardin, supra note 48, at 1012-84. On the other hand, if the parties are able to resolve the 
entire dispute in arbitration, deferral might be appropriate. See discussion of Rabin's proposal 
infra note 314. The General Counsel has indicated an intent to follow the normal deferral policy 
is cases involving ADA issues. See General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 218, at n.18. 
289. See supra note 56. 
290. See 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) § 51:261 (Jan. 11, 1993). 
291. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 279. 
292. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text. 
293. See ADA§ 513, 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. II 1990). 
294. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 248-49. 
295. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). But cf Bender v. A.G. 
Edwards & Sons, 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992) (securities broker required to arbitrate claims of 
gender discrimination under Title VII pursuant to arbitration clause in broker registration 
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ver Company,296 the United States Supreme Court held that the 
employee was entitled to pursue an action in federal court alleging race 
discrimination under Title VII despite an arbitration decision finding 
that he was discharged for just cause.297 The issue of race discrimina-
tion had been raised before the arbitrator, but was not mentioned in the 
decision. 298 The Court found that the employee was entitled to a trial de 
novo because the two proceedings differed significantly.299 The arbitra-
tion dealt with contractual rather than statutory issues and the arbitra-
tor's function was to determine the intent of the parties, rather than to 
resolve statutory claims.300 Additionally, the arbitration was informal 
and did not contain the procedural safeguards of judicial proceedings.301 
In further support of its decision, the Court noted the union's control 
over the grievance procedure, which might result in subordination of the 
individual grievant's interest to the collective interests of the bargaining 
unit.302 
Because the ADA adopted the enforcement procedures and reme-
dies of Title VII,303 there is a strong argument that the Gardner-Denver 
rule should apply. Yet, the Court there noted that "Title VII does not 
speak expressly to the relationship between federal courts and the griev-
ance-arbitration machinery of collective bargaining agreements."304 
While the ADA does not expressly mention arbitration under collective 
agreement); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992) (same). 
Initially, the district court and the court of appeals denied Dean Witter's demand for arbitration 
pursuant to the agreement signed by Alford. 712 F. Supp. 547 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd, 905 F.2d 104 
(5th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded Alford in light of Gilmer v. Interstate/ 
Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991). The court of appeals remanded to the District Court, 
939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991), which dismissed the plaintiffs claims with an order to arbitrate. 
975 F.2d at 1161. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal. Id. See also Newton v. Southern 
Pac. Transp. Co., 141 L.R.R.M. 2477 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (arbitration under Railway Labor Act 
requires dismissal of Title VII claim of railroad employee); Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 
No. 92-12774-T, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10255 (D.C. Mass. 1993) (insurance sales agent required 
to arbitrate gender discrimination claim pursuant to arbitration clause in her agent contract). 
296. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
297. 415 U.S. at 44. The Court rejected arguments that the employee had foregone his 
statutory claim by virtue of election of remedies or waiver. Id. at 49. The Court later reached the 
same result in cases involving statutory claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 
U.S. 728 (1981); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984). 
298. 415 U.S. at 42. 
299. Id. at 52. The Court did note that the arbitration decision could be admitted into evidence 
and accorded the weight that the court deemed appropriate. Id. at 59-60. 
300. Id. at 53. The Court noted that arbitrators are chosen for their expertise in industrial 
relations, not their legal expertise. Id. at 52. 
301. Id. at 57-58. 
302. Id. at 58 n.19. 
303. ADA§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. II 1990). 
304. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). The 1991 Civil Rights Act, 
which amended Title VII, added a provision encouraging alternative dispute resolution which is 
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bargaining agreements, it does encourage the use of arbitration "where 
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law."305 
Given this express sanction of arbitration, courts could follow the 
approach articulated by the Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/John-
son Lane Corp. 306 In Gilmer, the Supreme Court held that an individual 
employee who had signed an arbitration agreement as a part of his appli-
cation for registration with the New York Stock Exchange was bound to 
arbitrate a statutory claim of age discrimination. 307 The Gilmer Court 
rejected the argument that arbitration is procedurally and substantively 
inadequate to resolve statutory disputes; an argument that had influenced 
the Gardner-Denver Court.308 The Court also distinguished Gardner-
Denver, however, noting first that the employees there, unlike Gilmer, 
had not agreed to arbitrate statutory claims and thus, the arbitrator had 
no authority to resolve such claims.309 Second, the Gilmer Court noted 
the absence of the tension between collective and individual rights 
because Gilmer involved a nonunion workplace.310 The final differenti-
ating factor mentioned by the Court was that the Gardner-Denver case 
was decided under Title VII, not the Federal Arbitration Act, which 
"reflects a 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.' "311 
Gilmer followed the Court's recent trend favoring arbitration of 
statutory disputes.312 Nevertheless, and despite the language in the 
identical to Section 513 of the ADA. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, Section 118, 
42 U.S.C. § 1981, note (Supp. III 1991). 
305. ADA § 513, 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. II 1990). 
306. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991). 
307. Id. at 1650. 
308. Id. at 1654. The Court did examine the arbitration procedures at issue, finding them 
satisfactory, thus suggesting that in the absence of certain protections, arbitration of statutory 
claims might inadequately protect statutory rights. Id. at 1655. 
309. Id. at 1655-57. 
310. Id. at 1655. The Court seemed to elevate this concern in Gilmer, since in Gardner-
Denver it was relegated to a footnote. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 
(I 974). In Barrentine, however, which followed Gardner-Denver but preceded Gilmer, the Court 
emphasized its concern about the potential for divergence between the interests of the union, 
which is required to balance individual and collective interests, and the interests of the grievant. 
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 742 (1981). 
311. Id. at 1657 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 625 (1985)). Commentators on Gilmer have speculated about whether it will be applied to 
require arbitration under employment agreements, since the Federal Arbitration Act states that 
"nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees 
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.'' 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). 
See, e.g., James A. King, Jr. et al., Agreeing to Disagree on EEO Disputes, 9 LAB. LAW. 97, 107-
14 (1993); Plass, supra note 279, at 792-94; James A. Burstein & Kenneth D. Schwartz, Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation: The Supreme Coun Endorses Arbitration of Age 
Discrimination Claims, 17 EMP. REL. L.J. 173, 181-83 (1991); Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of 
Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CH1.-KENT L. REv. 753, 753-54 (1990). 
312. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); 
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ADA encouraging arbitration, the Gilmer Court's distinction of Gard-
ner-Denver suggests that arbitration of a contractual disability claim 
under the collective bargaining agreement should not preclude adjudica-
tion of the statutory claim.313 The reasoning of the Gardner-Denver 
Court remains persuasive with respect to statutory discrimination 
claims.314 Application of the Gardner-Denver rule to ADA claims is 
consistent with the legislative history, which indicates that Congress did 
not intend for Section 513 of the ADA to preclude litigation, even where 
there is a contractual agreement to arbitrate.315 
Because unions will be encouraged to negotiate contractual provi-
sions regarding disability discrimination and to arbitrate grievances 
under those provisions, both to protect disabled employees and to avoid 
liability under the ADA, this rule may provide a disabled employee with 
two bites at the apple, one in arbitration and one in court. Although dual 
litigation will be costly to the employer and to the adjudicatory system, 
such a rule will further the statutory purpose of eradicating disability 
discrimination. Furthermore, if the employee prevails in arbitration, he 
or she may decline to proceed under the ADA, resulting in savings of 
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 
614. 
313. See Plass, supra note 279, at 779 for a suggestion that the courts may rely on language 
encouraging arbitration in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to "accommodate and defer to arbitral 
resolution of Title VII disputes on a broad scale." See also Arbitrators Told to Be Sensitive to 
Workforce Diversity, Perceptions, 110 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at d21 (June 10, 1993) (reporting 
on presentations at the Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators suggesting that 
arbitrators will be hearing more discrimination cases); Departing EEOC General Counsel Sees 
Need for New Direction At Overwhelmed Agency, l ll Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at d3 (June l l, 
1993) (EEOC General Counsel suggests greater use of alternative dispute resolution as one 
method of reducing the overload of cases at the underfunded, understaffed agency). Cf. Wendy S. 
Tien, Note, Compulsory Arbitration of ADA Claims: Disabling the Disabled, 77 MINN. L. Rev. 
1443 (1993) (compulsory binding arbitration of ADA claims is inconsistent with Congressional 
intent and the policies underlying the ADA, and it is not required by the Federal Arbitration Act 
which broadly excludes employment contracts). 
314. As noted by Professor Estreicher, the most persuasive reason for following the Gardner· 
Denver rule is that the union has no authority to waive or compromise the employee's statutory 
rights. See Estreicher, supra note 311, at 780-81. See also Rabin, supra note 2, at 227 (key for 
the Court in Gardner-Denver was that employee could not be bound by union's prospective 
waiver of public rights). For a recent case holding that arbitration under the Railway Labor Act 
does not bar judicial consideration of discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act, see 
Bates V; Long Island R.R. Co., No. 92-9308, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 16259 (2d Cir. July 2, 1993). 
Professor Rabin's article makes an appealing argument for utilizing arbitration for claims 
involving both public and private rights, such as cases where the right to accommodation conflicts 
with seniority rights under the agreement. The proposal would involve some changes in the 
existing arbitral system and in the scope of judicial review. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 242-62. 
315. See Legislative History, supra note 181, Vol.I, at 516-17 (''The Committee believes that 
the approach articulated by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. applies 
equally to the ADA and does not intend that Section 513 be used to preclude rights and remedies 
that would otherwise be available to persons with disabilities"). 
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time and expense for both the parties and the administrative and judicial 
systems.316 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Application of the Americans With Disabilities Act to the union-
ized workplace raises issues unique to that setting. The existing statu-
tory and regulatory guidance for employers and unions striving to 
comply with ADA obligations is limited. Ideally, Congress should 
address the problem by clarifying the union's obligations under the 
ADA and resolving the conflicts between the ADA and the NLRA, two 
important Congressional mandates. Since Congressional revisitation of 
the statutes is unlikely, however, this Article suggests regulatory and 
judicial interpretations of the statute that would resolve much of the 
ambiguity and provide clearer guidance for employers, unions and dis-
abled employees. The suggested interpretations attempt to reconcile the 
ADA and the NLRA without sacrificing the goals of either statute. At 
the same time, the proposals attempt to draw some clear lines to mini-
mize uncertainty and therefore, litigation. · 
Unions can play an important role in enforcing the rights of dis-
abled employees and in educating the entire workforce about how to 
accommodate the disabled. If they seize the opportunity to do so, it will 
be a significant step toward eradication of disability discrimination. 
316. See Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines 
and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 457, 537 (1992). Arbitration is generally less expensive than 
litigation. Id. at 525. An employee who wins in arbitration may choose to litigate, however, for 
the statute provides remedies for intentional discrimination that are generally unavailable in 
arbitration, such as compensatory and punitive damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 198l(a)(2), (b) (1988 & 
Supp. Ill 1991); Summers, supra, at 527. Compensatory and punitive damages are not, however, 
available in disparate impact cases or in cases involving failure to provide reasonable 
accommodation where the employer can show good faith efforts to make such accommodation. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 198l(a)(l),(3) (1988 & Supp. Ill 1991). 
